The Complete Works of Plato

he spoke of advantage, in that the advantage of the stronger is what the weaker must perform; and he posited this as justice. — “But that was not the case,” Polemarchus said, refuting him. — “Not at all,” Polemarchus said, disagreeing; “but this is what Thrasymachus now says, so let us accept it from him. And tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you intended to say was just? That the advantage of the stronger is deemed to be for the stronger, whether it is advantageous or not—are we to say that this is what you mean?” — “Not in the least,” he said. — “But do you consider me to call one who errs the ‘stronger’ at the moment when he errs?” — “I for one thought you were saying this, when you agreed that rulers are not infallible, but that they do err at times.” — “You are a quibbler in arguments, Socrates,” he said; “for do you call a physician one who errs regarding the sick, at the very moment he errs? Or a calculator, who errs in a calculation, at the moment when he errs, by that very error? Yet I suppose we speak in terms of language like this: that the physician erred, and the calculator erred, and the grammarian erred. But I believe that each of these, insofar as he is what we call him, never errs; so that, according to the strict account—since you are fond of precise speech—no craftsman errs. For it is when knowledge deserts him that the one who errs errs, in which case he is no craftsman; so that a craftsman, or a wise man, or a ruler, does not err at the time when he is a ruler. Yet anyone might say that the physician erred, and the ruler erred. Consider me, therefore, to be answering you now in that way. That which is most accurate happens to be this: that the ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, does not err; and not erring, he posits what is best for himself, and this the subject must perform. So that, just as I said from the beginning, I say that justice is performing the advantage of the stronger.” — “Very well,” said I, “Thrasymachus; do you think I am quibbling?” — “Indeed you are,” he said, “for do you think I asked you what I did out of a desire to act maliciously in the arguments?” — “I know well that you do,” I said, “and it will avail you nothing; for you would neither escape my notice if you acted maliciously, nor, if you did not escape my notice, could you force me by your argument.” — “I would not even attempt it,” said I, “my good sir; but so that such a thing does not happen to us again, define in which way you speak: the ruler and the stronger—do you mean the one in the common sense, or the one by the strict account that you just now spoke of, whose advantage it is the duty of the weaker to perform because he is the stronger?” — “The one who is a ruler in the most accurate account,” he said; “as for that, act maliciously and quibble if you can; I grant you no quarter.” — “But you think I would not be able to; do you suppose I would go to such a pitch of madness as to attempt to shave a lion and quibble with Thrasymachus?” — “At any rate, you just attempted it,” he said, “being nothing yourself.” — “Enough of such things,” said I. “But tell me: the physician by the strict account, whom you mentioned just now, is he a money-maker or a healer of the sick? And speak of the one who is truly a physician.” — “A healer of the sick.” — “What of the pilot? Is the correct pilot a ruler of sailors, or a sailor?” — “A ruler of sailors.” — “I suppose it is not to be taken into account that he sails in the ship; nor should he be called a sailor, for he is not called a pilot because of sailing, but because of his art and his rule over the sailors.” — “True,” he said. — “And so for each of these, there is some advantage?” — “Certainly.” — “And is not the art,” said I, “naturally ordered for this: to seek and provide the advantage for each?” — “For this,” he said. — “And is there any advantage for each of the arts, other than that it be as perfect as possible?” — “Why do you ask this?” — “Just as I said,” I replied, “if you should ask whether it is sufficient for the body to be a body, or whether it requires something else, I would say that it is in every way in need; for this reason the art that has now been discovered exists, because the body is deficient and it is not sufficient for it to be as it is; the art was prepared for this purpose, to provide the things that are advantageous to it; or do you think I would be correct in saying so, or not?” — “Correct,” he said. “What then? Is medicine deficient for the body, or is some other art in need of some excellence—as eyes of vision, and ears of hearing; and for these reasons is there need of some art for them that considers and provides for what is advantageous to them? Does then some deficiency also exist in the art itself, and does each art require another art to consider what is advantageous to it?