The Complete Works of Plato

...as he who is considering [it] has performed; and is it then without end? Or does [the craft] itself consider its own advantage, or does it at times need another to consider for it the advantage of its own evil? For neither evil nor any error is present in any craft, nor does it befit a craft to seek the advantage of another, but rather of that over which it is a craft. And this is unharmed and complete, being correct, so long as each is entirely accurate, as it is; and consider it according to that accurate account, whether it is so or otherwise.” He said, “It appears so.” “Therefore, medicine is not [the study of] the advantage of medicine, but of the body.” He said, “Yes.” “Nor horsemanship of horsemanship, but of horses; nor any other craft of itself, for it has no need; but of that over which it is a craft.” He said, “It appears so.” “But indeed, Thrasymachus, crafts do rule and hold power over that of which they are the crafts.” He conceded this, though very reluctantly. “Therefore, no knowledge considers or commands the advantage of the stronger, but rather that of the weaker and of the one ruled by it.” He agreed to this at last, though he attempted to fight against it. When he had agreed, I said, “Then is it not true that no physician, insofar as he is a physician, considers or commands the advantage of the physician, but that of the sick? For it has been agreed that the accurate physician is a ruler of bodies, and not a money-maker; or has it not been agreed?” He assented. “And therefore, is the accurate pilot a ruler of sailors, and not a sailor?” It was agreed. “Therefore, such a pilot and ruler will not consider or command the advantage of the pilot, but that of the sailor and of the subject.” He assented reluctantly. “Therefore,” I said, “Thrasymachus, no one in any position of authority, insofar as he is a ruler, considers or commands his own advantage, but that of the subject, and for whom he himself works; and looking toward that, and toward what is advantageous and fitting for it, he says what he says and does what he does.”

When we had reached this point of the argument, and it was evident to all that the account of justice had turned into its opposite, Thrasymachus, instead of answering, said, “Tell me, Socrates, do you have a nurse?” “What is this?” said I. “Ought you not to be answering rather than asking such things?” “Because,” he said, “she leaves you sniveling, and does not wipe your nose when you need it; you who do not even recognize sheep or shepherds.” “And why is that, in particular?” said I. “Because you think that shepherds or cowherds consider the good of the sheep or the cows, and fatten them and tend to them, looking to something other than the good of their masters and their own; and indeed, you think that the rulers in cities—those who truly rule—think differently about their subjects than one would feel toward sheep, and that they consider anything else day and night than where they themselves shall profit. And you are so far off concerning the just and justice, and the unjust and injustice, that you are ignorant that justice and the just are in truth an ‘other’s good,’ the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a private harm to the one who obeys and serves; while injustice is the opposite, and it rules over those who are truly simple and just; and the subjects do what is advantageous for him, being the stronger, and they make him happy by serving him, but themselves not in the least. And it must be considered in this way, most simple Socrates: that the just man has the worse of it everywhere compared to the unjust man. First, in private contracts—wherever such a person has a partnership with such another—you would nowhere find, at the dissolution of the partnership, the just man having more than the unjust, but less. Then, in matters toward the city, when there are taxes, the just man contributes more from an equal amount, and the other less; and when there are distributions, one gains nothing, while the other gains much. And indeed, when each holds some office, it falls to the just man—even if there is no other loss—to have his private affairs in a worse state due to neglect, and to gain nothing from the public treasury because he is just; and in addition to these, to be hated by his kin and acquaintances whenever he is unwilling to serve them against what is just. But for the unjust man, all the opposites to these occur.