The Complete Works of Plato

"How so?" he said. "Through blindness, I suppose?"

"You mean, perhaps, instead of sight. Which one, then? Since excellence is its own... for it surely is not correct; rather, those things which perform their own work well, do so by their own excellence, and those that perform them badly, do so through vice."

"You speak the truth," he said.

"Therefore, will ears, when deprived of their own excellence, perform their own work badly?"

"Certainly."

"Shall we then apply the same reasoning to all other things?" he said.

"That is my opinion."

"Come then, after this, consider the following. Is there some work of the soul which you could not perform by means of any other existing thing? For instance, such as this: to care for, to rule, to deliberate, and all such things. Could we justly assign these to any other thing than the soul, and claim they are its own?"

"To no other."

"And again, what of living? Shall we say that is the work of the soul?"

"Most certainly," he said.

"And do we not also say there is a certain excellence of the soul?"

"We do."

"Will the soul, then, ever perform its own works well, Thrasymachus, if it is deprived of its own excellence, or is it impossible?"

"It is impossible."

"Therefore, it is necessary for a bad soul to rule and care for things badly, and for a good soul to do all these things well."

"It is necessary."

"Did we not agree that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice its vice?"

"We did indeed agree."

"Therefore, the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live badly."

"It appears so," he said, "according to your argument."

"But surely, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not, is the opposite."

"How could it be otherwise?"

"The just man, therefore, is happy, and the unjust is wretched."

"Let it be so," he said.

"But surely, to be wretched is not profitable, whereas to be happy is."

"How could it be otherwise?"

"Therefore, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice."

"Let this, Socrates," he said, "be your feast at the Bendideia."

"It is by your hand, Thrasymachus, since you have become gentle toward me and have ceased being angry. Yet I have not fared well at the feast, though this is my own fault, not yours. Rather, like the gluttons who snatch a taste of whatever is constantly being brought past before they have properly enjoyed the previous dish, I think I have done the same. Before we found the answer to our first inquiry—what justice is—I let that go and rushed to examine whether it is vice and ignorance, or wisdom and excellence. And when a later argument arose that injustice is more profitable than justice, I could not restrain myself from moving on to that from the former. Consequently, it has come about for me, through this dialogue, that I know nothing. For when I do not know what justice is, I shall hardly know whether it happens to be a kind of excellence, or whether the one who possesses it is not happy, or is happy."

PLATO, REPUBLIC, BOOK TWO.

Decorative initial capital 'Ε' featuring floral and scrolling vine motifs.
When I had said these things, I thought I was finished with the discussion. But this was, as it seems, merely a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always most courageous in every matter, did not accept Thrasymachus’ withdrawal, but said: "Tell me, Socrates, do you wish to seem to have persuaded us, or to have truly persuaded us, that it is in every way better to be just than unjust?"

"I would choose to have truly persuaded you," I said, "if it were up to me."

"Then you are not doing what you wish," he said. "For tell me: does it seem to you that there is a kind of good which we would choose to possess, not desiring it for its consequences, but welcoming it for its own sake? Such as rejoicing, and all pleasures that are harmless and from which nothing else follows for the future other than the joy of having them?"

"Yes, it seems to me there is something of that sort."

"What about that which we love both for its own sake and for the things that come from it? Such as understanding, seeing, and being healthy? For such things, I suppose, we welcome for both reasons."

And he said, "Do you see a third kind of good, such as physical training, or being treated by a physician when ill, or the practice of medicine?"