The Complete Works of Plato

...nature, as well as other methods of acquisition; we would say that these are laborious, but that they benefit us, and we would not consent to possess them for their own sake, but for the sake of wages and all other things that come from them. For indeed, it exists in the third category. But tell me, in which category do you place justice itself?"

"I, for my part," I said, "place it in the fairest category—that which must be loved by one who is to be happy, both for its own sake and for the sake of what comes from it."

"That is not, however, the opinion of the many," he said. "They place it in the laborious category, which must be practiced for the sake of wages and good repute because of opinion, but which must be avoided for its own sake as being difficult."

"I know," I said, "that this is the opinion; and for a long time it has been censured by Thrasymachus as being such, while injustice is praised. But I am, it seems, a slow learner."

"But come," he said, "listen also to me, to see if you are of the same opinion. For it seems to me that Thrasymachus has been charmed by you like a snake, sooner than he ought to have been. But the demonstration concerning each has not yet occurred to my mind. For I long to hear what each is, and what power it has, existing by itself in the soul, and to let the wages and the things that come from them be. I will therefore do this, if it pleases you: I will renew the argument of Thrasymachus. And first, I will speak of what they say justice is and whence it has come; second, that all who practice it do so unwillingly as a necessity, and not as a good; and third, that they do so with reason. For, as they say, the life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just man. Although, to me, O Socrates, it does not seem so; yet I am at a loss, having my ears dinned by listening to Thrasymachus and countless others. But the argument on behalf of justice, that it is better than injustice, I have not yet heard from anyone as I desire. I wish to hear it praised for its own sake. And I think I am most likely to learn this from you. Therefore, I will exert myself and speak in praise of the unjust life, and in speaking, I will show you in what manner I wish to hear it from you as well, when you censure injustice and praise justice. But see if what I say is agreeable to you."

"Most agreeable of all," I said. "On what subject could a man of sense more often take pleasure in speaking and hearing?"

"You speak most excellently," he said, "and hear now that which I said I would speak of first: what justice happens to be, and whence it has come. For they say that to do injustice is naturally good, and to suffer it, evil; but that the evil of suffering it exceeds the good of doing it. So that when men commit and suffer injustice against one another, and experience both, to those who are unable to avoid the one and choose the other, it seems profitable to make a compact with one another neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. And from thence they began to establish laws and covenants of their own, and to call the command of the law 'lawful' and 'just.' And this, they say, is the generation and essence of justice, being a mean between that which is best—if one commits injustice and does not pay the penalty—and that which is worst—if one is wronged and is unable to take vengeance. But justice, being in the middle of both these, is cherished not as a good, but as something honored due to the inability to do injustice; for he who is able to do it, and is a man in truth, would never enter into a compact with anyone neither to do injustice nor to suffer it; for he would be mad. Such, then, O Socrates, is the nature of justice, and such are the things from which it naturally arises, as the argument goes. And that those who practice it do so unwillingly due to an inability to do injustice, we might best perceive if we were to make this supposition in our mind: by giving power to each, both to the just and the unjust, to do whatever he wishes; then we might follow them, observing where desire leads each one. We would catch the just man red-handed going the same way as the unjust, on account of greed, which every nature is born to pursue as a good, but which by law is forcibly diverted to the honor of equality. And the power I speak of would be most like this: if they were to have that power which they say once belonged to the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian. For he was a shepherd serving the then-ruler of Lydia; and when a great rain and earthquake occurred, a part of the earth was rent, and a chasm formed in the place where he was grazing. Having seen and marveled at it, he descended and saw other wonders which they relate, and a hollow bronze horse