The Complete Works of Plato

...a bronze, hollow horse, having doors; upon stooping to look through which, he saw a corpse within, greater in appearance than that of a human. And this one had nothing else on, but upon his hand was a golden ring, which he took off and exited. When the shepherds’ usual monthly meeting occurred, in order to report to the king concerning the flocks, he also arrived, wearing the ring. As he sat with the others, he happened to turn the collet of the ring toward himself, into the inside of his hand; and this having occurred, he became invisible to those sitting beside him. And they spoke of him as if he were gone, and he marveled at this. And again, fumbling with the ring, he turned the collet outward, and having turned it, he became visible. Reflecting on this, he experimented with the ring to see if it possessed this power; and thus it happened to him: when he turned the collet inward, he became unseen; but outward, seen. Perceiving this, he immediately contrived to be one of the messengers sent to the king. Having arrived and seduced his wife, he conspired with her against the king, killed him, and seized the rule. If, therefore, there were two such rings, and the just man were to put one on, and the unjust man the other, no one would be, as it might appear, so adamant that he would remain in justice and dare to abstain from the property of others and not touch it; when it were in his power to take whatever he wished from the market without fear; and, entering into houses, to lie with whom he pleased; and to kill; and to release from bonds those whom he pleased; and to do other things among men, being like a god. And acting thus, he would do nothing different from the other, but both would go the same way. And yet, one might say this is a great proof that no one is just willingly, but by compulsion; as if it were not a private good. For wherever each person thinks he will be able to act unjustly, he acts unjustly. For every man thinks that injustice is, in private, much more profitable than justice. And he thinks truly, as the one who speaks about such an argument says. For if anyone, having obtained such power, were never to wish to act unjustly, nor to touch the property of others, he would seem most wretched to those who perceived it, and most foolish; though they would praise him in the presence of one another, deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice. So much for this.

But as for the judgment itself of the life of which we are speaking, if we separate the most just man and the most unjust man, we shall be able to judge correctly; if not, then not. What, then, is the separation? It is this: let us not take anything away from the unjust man of his injustice, nor from the just man of his justice, but let us place each completely into his own practice. First, then, let the unjust man act like skilled craftsmen; as, for instance, a master pilot or physician discerns both what is impossible and what is possible in the craft, and attempts the one, but lets the other pass. Furthermore, if he should happen to stumble, he is capable of setting it right. Thus also, let the unjust man, undertaking his injustices rightly, remain undetected, if he is to be a truly unjust man. The one who is caught must be thought of as incompetent. For the ultimate injustice is to seem just when one is not. We must, therefore, grant to the perfectly unjust man the most perfect injustice, and not take it away; but we must let him, while committing the greatest injustices, have procured for himself the greatest reputation for justice. And if he should happen to stumble, he must be capable of setting it right; being able to speak to persuade if any of his injustices are reported, and to use force whenever force is needed, due to his courage and strength, and due to his provision of friends and wealth.

Having posited him as such, let us set the just man alongside him in the argument: a man simple and noble, who, according to Aeschylus, wishes not to seem, but to be good. We must take away the "seeming." For if he should seem to be just, he would have honors and rewards, appearing to be such. It is unclear, therefore, whether he would be such for the sake of justice or for the sake of the rewards and honors. He must be stripped of everything except justice, and made to be disposed in a manner opposite to the former; for while doing no injustice, let him have the greatest reputation for injustice, so that he may be tested for justice, by not being softened by bad repute and the things that arise from it. But...