The Complete Works of Plato

gainful and varied. But because it is natural, it is not easy for one who is evil to remain hidden forever, nor, indeed, is anything else easy for those of great nature; nevertheless, if we are to be happy, we must walk in this path, as the tracks of the arguments lead. For to remain hidden, we shall organize conspiracies and societies; and there are teachers of persuasion, imparting a political and forensic wisdom, by means of which we shall persuade some, while we force others, in such a way that, while seeking gain, we do not pay the penalty. But then, is it possible to neither hide from nor force the gods? If, therefore, they do not exist, or if they take no care of human affairs, then we too need not take care to remain hidden. But if they do exist and do take care, we have no knowledge of them or report of them from any other source than from the traditions and the poets who have recounted their lineage; and these very same poets say that they are such as can be swayed and persuaded by sacrifices, gentle vows, and offerings. We must believe either both or neither; if we must believe them, we ought to act unjustly and offer sacrifices from the fruits of our injustices. For by being just, we shall be unpunished by the gods; but we shall push away the gains from injustice. And if we are unjust, we shall gain; and by entreating them—transgressing and sinning—we shall persuade them and escape without punishment. But will we pay the penalty in Hades for the wrongs we have committed here, either we ourselves or our children’s children? But, my friend, you who are calculating according to nature, consider that the rites of initiation also have great power, as do the releasing gods, as the greatest cities say, and the children of the gods, who became poets and prophets of the gods; they declare that these things are so. By what argument, then, should we still choose justice over the greatest injustice? If we acquire it along with a counterfeit decorum, we shall fare according to our desires before both gods and men, both while living and when departed, as the discourse of the many and the most excellent tells us. From all that has been said, what mechanism remains, O Socrates, for anyone who possesses any power of fortune, or wealth, or body, or lineage, to desire to honor justice, and not to laugh when he hears it praised? For if anyone is able to refute as false what we have said, and has sufficiently realized that justice is best, he surely has much indulgence and is not angry with the unjust; but he knows that, unless someone, because of a divine nature, is disgusted by acting unjustly, or having gained knowledge refrains from it, none of the others is just willingly, but out of cowardice, old age, or some other weakness, he blames injustice, being unable to commit it. And that this is clear is shown by the fact that the first of such men to attain power is the first to act unjustly, to the extent that he is able. And for all these things, there is no other cause than that from which this whole argument took its start, and which he and I wished to say to you, O Socrates. That is, O wondrous man, of all you who claim to be admirers of justice, starting from the heroes of old, whose words have been left behind for the men of the present, no one has ever blamed injustice, nor praised justice in any other way than through the reputations, honors, and gifts that result from them; but as for each of them in its own power, existing in the soul of the possessor, and hidden from gods and men, no one has ever, either in poetry or in private discourse, sufficiently pursued the argument to show that the one is the greatest of all evils that the soul contains within itself, and justice the greatest good. For if it had been spoken of in this way by all of you from the beginning, and you had persuaded us from youth, we would not be guarding against one another so as not to act unjustly, but each man would be his own best guardian, fearing that by acting unjustly he would dwell with the greatest evil. These things, O Socrates—and perhaps even more than these—Thrasymachus and someone else might say about justice and injustice, overturning their power in a vulgar manner, as it seems to me. But I, for I have no need to hide anything from you, am speaking, desiring to hear you defend the opposite as strongly as I am able. Therefore, do not merely show us by argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what each, by its own nature, does to its possessor—the one being evil and the other good—and strip away the reputations, just as Glaucon directed. For if you do not strip away the true reputations from each side and add the false ones, we shall say that you are not praising justice, but the reputation of it; nor are you blaming injustice, but the reputation of it, and are advising one to be unjust while remaining hidden.