Averroes' Paraphrase of Plato's Republic

by which it becomes angry, but only where and to the extent that wisdom has decreed, and only at the time that wisdom has demanded the same. Just as in a human being, he is strong in the part by which he becomes angry, while he uses it as the intellect has ordered and has prescribed the measure and the time. The same must also be said concerning temperance and any other virtue. Finally, he who is endowed with all virtues, both rational and moral, will be held to be more excellent if he has attained more excellent virtues. And this is that justice which Plato investigates in the first book of this work and declares in the fourth, which is nothing other than that each one in the Republic should fulfill his own natural duty as best as he possibly can. This, however, ought to be understood when the parts of the Republic obey the mandate of contemplative science and those presiding over it. And hence it is manifest that this justice excels in that part which contains the professors of contemplative sciences, and rules over all, just as justice in a single soul exists in that each of its parts is in its own office; that is, as it befits, and when it befits. Nor can this be done in the parts of the soul otherwise than if the intellect governs them, in which way the matter also stands in the Republic. Nor should it escape your notice that some of these virtues are said to be in the Republic because they are in a certain part of it, such as wisdom and fortitude; others, however, because they exist in all its parts, such as
Justice

how virtue is in the Republic: