The Prince

there is no longer any remedy. Beyond this, the province is not stripped by your officials. The subjects are satisfied with the immediate recourse to the prince, whence they have more reason to love him, wishing to be good, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. Whoever from the outside might want to assault that state has more respect for it; so much so that by living there, one can lose it only with the greatest difficulty. The other best remedy is to send colonies into one or two places that are almost the keys of that state; because it is necessary either to do this or to keep many armed men and infantry there. In Colonies, the Prince does not spend much; and without his expense, or with little, he sends and keeps them there, and only offends those from whom he takes the fields and houses to give to the new inhabitants, who are a minimum part of that State, and those whom he offends, remaining scattered or poor, can never harm him, and all the others remain on one side not offended, and for this reason they easily become quiet; on the other side, they are fearful of not erring, so that it might not happen to them as it did to those who have been stripped. I conclude that these Colonies, which do not cost, are more faithful, offend less, and the offended, being poor or scattered, cannot harm, as I have said; because one must note that men should either be caressed or extinguished, because they avenge themselves for light offenses; for grave ones, they cannot. So that the offense one does to a man must be such that one does not fear vengeance. But by keeping armed men there in place of Colonies, one spends much more, having to consume all the revenues of that state in the guard. So that the acquisition turns into a loss for him, and offends much more: because he harms that whole State, moving his army about with their quarters, a hardship that everyone feels, and everyone becomes an enemy to him, and they are enemies who can harm him, remaining beaten in their own homes. On every side, therefore, this guard is useless, just as that of the colonies is useful. Furthermore, he who is in a dissimilar province, as has been said, must make himself head and defender of the less powerful neighbors, and strive to weaken the more powerful ones of that region, and guard that through any accident a foreigner no less powerful than himself does not enter. And it will always happen that he will be brought in by those who are discontented in that region, either for too much ambition or for fear; as was seen once when the Aetolians brought the Romans into Greece, and in every other province that they entered.