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those to whom a State is granted, either for money or by the favor of the one who grants it. This happened to many in the cities of Ionia and the Hellespont in Greece, where they were made Princes by Darius so that they might hold them for his security and glory. In the same way, those Emperors were made who, having been private citizens, rose to the Empire through the corruption of the soldiers. Such men depend simply upon the will and fortune of those who have made them great, which are two very volatile and unstable things. They do not know how, nor are they able, to maintain that rank. They do not know how because, unless a man is of great genius and virtù prowess, it is not reasonable that one who has always lived in a private station should know how to command. They are not able because they do not have forces that can be friendly and faithful to them. Furthermore, States that arise suddenly, like all other things in nature that sprout and grow quickly, cannot have their roots and connections such that the first adverse weather does not kill them—unless those who, as has been said, have suddenly become Princes are of such virtù prowess that they immediately know how to prepare to preserve what fortune has placed in their laps, and to build later the foundations that others had laid before becoming Princes.
I wish to bring forth two examples from our own memory regarding these two ways of becoming a Prince: by virtù prowess or by fortune. These are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and with great virtù prowess, became Duke of Milan from being a private citizen, and what he had acquired with a thousand toils, he maintained with little effort. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia (called Duke Valentino by the common people) acquired his state through the fortune of his father and lost it with the same, notwithstanding that he used every effort and did all those things that a prudent and virtuous man ought to do to plant his roots in those States which the arms and fortune of others had granted him. For, as was said above, he who does not lay the foundations beforehand might, with great virtù prowess, do so later, although it is done with discomfort to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, one considers all the progress of the Duke, one will see how great a foundation he had laid for his future power. I do not judge it superfluous to discuss these, for I would not know what better precepts to give to a new Prince than the example of his actions; and if his orders—