Summa Theologica

CONCLUSION. — Superstition is a vice opposed to religion by way of excess, by which one offers divine worship either to whom one should not, or not in the way one should.

I answer that, as was said above (Q. LXXXI, art. 5, ad 3), religion is a moral virtue. Now, every moral virtue consists in a mean, as was established above (1-2, Q. LXIV, art. 1). And therefore, a twofold vice is opposed to a moral virtue: one by way of excess; the other by way of defect. Now, it happens that one exceeds the mean of virtue not only according to the circumstance called "how much," but also according to other circumstances: whence, even in some virtues, such as magnanimity and magnificence, the vice exceeds the mean of virtue: not because it tends to something greater than the virtue, but perhaps to something less; yet it transcends the mean of virtue insofar as it does something to whom it should not, or when it should not, and similarly according to other things of this kind, as is evident from the Philosopher (Ethics, lib. IV, chap. 1 and 5). — Thus, therefore, superstition is a vice opposed to religion by way of excess, not because it offers more to divine worship than true religion, but because it offers divine worship either to whom it should not, or in the way it should not (1).

To the first, therefore, it should be said that, just as good is spoken of metaphorically in evil things, as we say a "good thief," so too are the names of virtues sometimes taken figuratively in evil things; just as prudence is sometimes taken for cunning, according to that text (Luke XVI, 8): The children of this world are more prudent than the children of light; and in this manner, superstition is said to be a religion.

To the second, it should be said that the etymology of a name is one thing, and the meaning of a name is another (2). For the etymology is considered according to that from which the name is imposed to signify; but the meaning of the name is considered according to that which the name is imposed to signify. Which are sometimes diverse: for the name of a stone is imposed from the hurting of the foot (laesione pedis), yet it does not mean that: otherwise iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. Similarly, it is not necessary that the name of superstition should signify that from which the name was imposed.

To the third, it should be said that religion cannot have an excess according to absolute quantity; yet it can have an excess according to a quantity of proportion, insofar as something is done in divine worship which should not be done.

ARTICLE II. — WHETHER THERE ARE DIVERSE SPECIES OF SUPERSTITION.

To the second, it is proceeded thus: 1. It seems that there are not diverse species of superstition. Because, according to the Philosopher (Topics, lib. I, chap. 13, before mid.), "if one of the opposites is said in many ways, the other is also (3)." But religion, to which superstition is opposed, does not have diverse species, but all its acts are referred to one species. Therefore, neither does superstition have diverse species.

2. Furthermore, opposites are about the same thing (4). But religion, to which superstition is opposed, is about those things by which we are ordered to God, as was established above (Q. LXXXI, art. 1 and 5). Therefore, the species of superstition, which is opposed to religion, cannot be considered according to some divinations of human events, or according to some observations of human acts.

(1) With this description coincides, as Sylvius notes, that which the gloss offers: superstition is religion observed beyond measure.
(2) The Holy Doctor observes this very frequently (Cf. part. I, Q. XIII, art. 2, ad 2, and Q. XXIX, art. 3, ad 2 and 5; Q. IX De potentia, art. 5, ad 1, and Sent. I, dist. 25, art. 2, ad 1).
(3) From the Greek καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν or also alterum [the other] add is said in many ways.
(4) In species or in genus: as can be seen in the Categories or Postpredicaments, chapter On Opposites.