Summa Theologica

QUESTION XCV.

Next, we must consider divinative superstition; and concerning this, eight things are asked: 1. Whether divination is a sin. — 2. Whether it is a species of superstition. — 3. On the species of divination. — 4. On the divination that is done through demons. — 5. On the divination that is done through the stars. — 6. On the divination that is done through dreams. — 7. On the divination that is done through auguries and other such observations. — 8. On the divination that is done through lots.

ARTICLE I. — WHETHER DIVINATION IS A SIN.

To the first it is proceeded thus. 1. It seems that divination is not a sin. For divination is named from something divine. But those things which are divine pertain more to holiness than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.

2. Furthermore, Augustine says (De lib. arbit. bk. I, ch. 1): "Who would dare to say that discipline is an evil?" and again: "I would by no means say that any intelligence could be evil." But some arts are divinatory, as is clear through the Philosopher (book on Memory, ch. 1, shortly from the beginning); divination itself also seems to pertain to some intelligence of truth. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.

3. Furthermore, a natural inclination is not toward any evil, because nature does not incline except to its like. But from a natural inclination men are solicited to foreknow future events, which pertains to divination. Therefore divination is not a sin.

But against this is what is said (Deut. XVIII, 2): Let there not be found any one that consults python spirits, nor diviners: and (in Dec. 26, qu. V, ch. 2) it is said: "Let those who seek out divinations lie under the rule of five years, according to the defined degrees of penance."

CONCLUSION. — Divination is a sin by which one usurps for oneself the knowledge and prediction of future things, as they are future, which pertains properly to God.

I answer that by the name of divination is understood a certain foretelling of future things. Now future things can be foreknown in two ways: one way in their causes; another way in themselves. The causes of future things relate in three ways: for some produce their effects by necessity and always, and such future effects can be foreknown and foretold with certainty from the consideration of their causes, just as astrologers foretell future eclipses. But some causes produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most part, yet they rarely fail; and through such causes future effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but through a certain conjecture; just as astrologers through the consideration of the stars can foreknow and foretell something about rains and droughts, and doctors about health or death. But some causes are those which, if they are considered in themselves, relate to either side; which is seen especially concerning rational powers, which relate to opposites, according to the Philosopher (Metaphysics, bk. IX, text 3 and 18); and such effects, or even if any effects occur by chance in a few cases from...