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To the listener.The first chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, he declares that in human affairs there is some good end. In the second, he shows that in human affairs there is an end that is better and more excellent than another end. In the third, he resolves a certain doubt which might arise from the difference between ends. In the first part of this first chapter, therefore, he brings forward this conclusion: that in human affairs there is a certain good end. And this conclusion can be proved thus: If every art, inquiry, action, and choice seek some good, and intend a certain end, then surely there is a certain end in human affairs. But the first is true, therefore also the second. The reasoning is clear: because through these, as if through principles of human operations, man performs all that he performs. The assumption is manifest of itself, that all these things, and each one of them, intends and seeks a certain end: therefore it follows that there is in human affairs some end and some good, because end and good are convertible. He also confirms this conclusion by the definition of the ancients regarding the good itself. It can also be proved in this manner: All things seek the good; but every art, inquiry, action, and choice are among the number of those things which exist; therefore these seek the good. But good and end are convertible; therefore these seek an end; from which it follows that there is some end in human affairs. The major premise is proved by the authority and definition of the ancients concerning the highest good or the good itself. It should be noted that the Philosopher rightly begins with this sentiment and proof, namely that there is some end in human affairs, so that he may incite us to attain it, that is, happiness itself.
{SEEMS TO SEEK.} He does not say "they seem" [in the plural], because those four things are not taken collectively, but distributively: as in, "every art seems to seek." Likewise "every inquiry," and so with the others. It should be noted that the Philosopher in his books most often uses a universal affirmative proposition, as here, as in the book of the Physics, and as in the Metaphysics: "All men by nature desire to know." Likewise in the Posteriors: "All instruction..." Likewise in the book On the Heavens: "All bodies," and the rest. For this proposition is the most excellent of all propositions, and from it arises science properly so called, which occurs through demonstration. It should be noted likewise that Aristotle took four things to prove this conclusion: namely art, inquiry, action, and choice. Because of all human operations