Nicomachean Ethics

There are two principles: intellect and appetite. Intellect is understood in two ways: either as speculative or as active. Appetite likewise is understood in two ways: as either elective or executive. The active intellect contains under itself every art, not only that which is properly so called, but every active science. But the speculative intellect contains under itself science, which is understood when he says: teaching is the way to science. Under the elective appetite is placed choice. Under the executive appetite is placed the act. But so that those four things may be more clearly understood as to what they are, let each be defined in this manner: Art is a productive habit with true reason, consisting of many things gathered from experience, which contribute to human use. Teaching is the mode and the way by which we are able to perceive either art or science. Act is an operation according to the choice of a man—that is, an action and not a production. Choice is the principle by which a man, when two things are proposed to him, chooses one rather than the other.

Albert, however, says that the Philosopher has sufficiently set down these four things, concerning which consideration is made in this moral teaching. For every principle that is considered by the moralist either directs or pursues. If it directs, it does so in two ways: either toward the true, or toward some work. If toward a work: then also in two ways: either toward a work that is to be made, or toward that which is to be done. If it directs toward the true: thus it is science or teaching. If it directs toward a work that is made: thus it is art itself. But if toward that which is done: thus it is active science, which is signified through choice. If, however, it is taken for execution: then it is explained through the act, which is that by which a man executes the things to be done. Therefore, these four things are well positioned.

But the Philosopher, as it seems, has used a reversed order. For teaching seems to be prior to art, since it is the way to science or art. Similarly, choice is prior to act. It must be said that one must begin from those things more known to us, as he himself will show later. But the arts themselves are more known to us than teachings, and the act more than the choice. It should be noted that choice is spoken of in three ways. In the first way, as it was defined above. In the second way, as it is the effect of deliberation, as it is taken in the third book of this work. In the third way, for the operation of the will, which is inclined by the habit and disposition which it has toward one thing more than toward its opposite, as it is taken in the fifth book of this work. Here, choice can be taken in any of these ways.

3 {The good itself.} Good is understood in two ways: either as truly existing or as appearing. Here may be taken that common notion which of both [can] be said