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temporally. To composites and forms that are in a subject, accidents are appropriate; they do not apply to immaterial forms. Whatever is in separable forms is being and a certain essential principal, perhaps equal. Nor is anything accidental or consequential found there. Motion and actions are different because of the differences of natures, not the other way around. If we say there is one genus of separate things, we confound theology. Separate substances do not agree in one certain genus in which they might be distinguished by differences; rather, they are distinguished by themselves and by the order of their degrees, insofar as they are referred to the First through different degrees of perfection. However, those which are referred to the First through a more similar mode agree more among themselves, and so for the last. The Good is twofold: that which is above essence, and that which is according to essence. Essence is the property of all the gods. But the Good itself is above essence and is called the cause of the Good, namely the principle of essential good. Consequently, the gods are distinguished among themselves according to the degrees of essence. In the ultimate rational souls, essential good is not present as it is in the gods, but a participation in the good according to intellectual beauty, yet this is present immovably.