First Chapter.

On the practical need for philosophy.

1. Just as the natural scientist is delighted by every expansion of his knowledge through experience and observation, so too is there for the thinker an interest in the mere arrangement and completed determination of his concepts. Out of this interest flows the speculative need for philosophy. But it often happens that the satisfaction of a need deviates somewhat from the expectations with which it was initially connected. The speculative need of the thinker usually prompts the opinion that an undivided whole will emerge from the arrangement of all main concepts; this whole is sought under the name of philosophy. On the other hand, after proper work, one finds, instead of the sought-after whole, three completely different sciences. Only one of them, metaphysics—which, taking the word in its broadest sense, encompasses reflection on ourselves, on the external world, and on the highest being—grants, at least in part, a form of knowledge. However, there separates from it, under the name of logic, a series of determinations regarding concepts as such, regarding their relation and connection, without regard to the question of what validity these concepts might have. Furthermore, various classes of such determinations separate themselves which merely indicate a value or lack of value, without regard to accidental inclination or hobby; the most important of these value-determinations relate to volition and action; the system of these is called ethics.