THE FIRST BOOK:

OR,

GENERAL PART.

CHAP. I.

Of the Causes of Common Errors.

The Introduction.

THE first and father cause of common Error, is the common infirmity of human Nature; of whose deceptible condition, although perhaps there should not need any other eviction than the frequent errors we shall ourselves commit, even in the express declarement hereof: Yet shall we illustrate the same from more infallible constitutions, and persons presumed as far from us in condition, as time; that is, our first and ingenerated forefathers. From whom as we derive our being, and the several wounds of constitution; so may we in some manner excuse our infirmities in the depravity of those parts, whose traductions were pure in them, and their originals but once removed from God. Who notwithstanding (if posterity may take leave to judge of the fact, as they are assured to suffer in the punishment) were grossly deceived in their perfection; and so weakly deluded in the clarity of their understanding, that it hath left no small obscurity in ours, how error should gain upon them.

Matter of great dispute, how our first parents could be so deceived.

For first, They were deceived by Satan; and that not in an invisible insinuation, but an open and discoverable apparition; that is, in the form of a Serpent; whereby although there were many occasions of suspicion, and such as could not easily escape a weaker circumspection, yet did the unwary apprehension of Eve take no advantage thereof. It hath therefore seemed strange unto some, she should be deluded by a Serpent, or subject her reason to a beast, which God had subjected unto hers. It hath empuzzled the enquiries of others to apprehend, and enforced them unto strange conceptions, to make out, how without fear or doubt she could discourse with such a creature, or hear a Serpent speak, without suspicion of imposture. The wits of others, have been so bold as to accuse her simplicity in receiving his temptation so coldly; and when such specious effects of the fruit were promised, as to make them like gods; not to desire, at least not to wonder he pursued not that benefit himself. And had it been their own case, would perhaps have replied, If the taste of this fruit maketh the eaters like gods, why remainest thou a beast? If it maketh us but like gods, we are so already: If thereby our eyes shall be opened hereafter, they are at present quick enough to discover thy deceit, and we desire them no opener, to behold our own shame. If to know good and evil be our advantage, although we have free will unto both, we desire...