Libri de Coelo IIII

August.

“more and less” pertains to the categories, and quality causes both; therefore, quantity is not quality. 6, p. i. Phys.: if substance and quantity are present, they are two, and what they are is not one. 7, p. says in the Categories, quantity is not quality. 8, Augustine says in 5 De Trinitate: In created things, that which is not spoken of according to substance remains to be spoken of according to accident; for all things happen to them that can either be lost or diminished, such as magnitudes, friendships, etc.

August.

Note “magnitudes.” 9. Aug., same book, ch. 13: In things which, by the participation of magnitude, are great, it is one thing to be and another to be great; in these things magnitude is one thing, and that which is great from that magnitude is another. And by no means is this magnitude what a “great house” is. 10. In the same

August.

book he says: In those things which are great without bulk, to be and to be great are the same; therefore, the opposite is the case in things which

Master sen.

are great by bulk. Similar is the statement of the Master, dist. 22 of the first book: God is great, not through some distinct magnitude. Thomas Bricot adduces these authorities. 11. In 7 Metaphysics

Tho. Bric.

he says that length, breadth, and depth are quantities, but not substances; because quantity does not enter into the definition of substance. 12. Averroes says: Quantity is the first trace of matter; and Themistius: quantity is the most immediate of the accidents of matter. 13. Many things are attributed to quantity which are denied of substance and quality; therefore they are not one. 4 Physics: quantity is not of the genus of agents and patients, but quality is. 2 De Anima: magnitude is sensible in itself, substance is sensible by accident. 1 Physics: The definition of the finite and the infinite belongs to quantity alone in itself, but to substance by accident. These are the more potent authorities for that opinion.

¶ Thirdly, for this same matter, reasons are adduced, and only the stronger ones. The first is that of Marsilius and Buridan. 1 Physics: take

Marsil. Buridan.

a bladder filled with air and closed, which resists one wishing to compress its sides. Now, it is not the matter that resists, because that is indifferent and could exist under a much smaller quantity. Nor is it the form, because it could exist even under a smaller one, as is evident in condensation; nor does any external thing resist: therefore, the quantity of the air will resist. And that neither matter nor form resists is proven by the manifest fact that if that bladder, which was previously in a warm and rare place, is placed in a cold place, then the sides will immediately lie close together. It is confirmed because in rarefaction the same substance remains, and the same quantity does not remain; therefore, quantity is distinguished from substance. Also, in condensation something is lost, and it is nothing but quantity. 4 Physics. It is confirmed because the parts of a condensed body move toward the center; therefore, they necessarily penetrate each other around the center, and thus, if they flee their own quantity, there will be a penetration of dimensions. It is confirmed thirdly: because if quantity is a “quantified thing,” then matter and form would be extended and penetrate each other in a lion, just as whiteness and sweetness would in milk.

¶ Furthermore, whenever some things are such that one can remain while the other does not, they are distinguished really; but this is the case with Eckard and his quantity, therefore. It is confirmed because the length of fire and of air are of the same species, but air and fire are not of the same species; therefore, they are distinguished from one another. Indeed, the distance between quantity and substance seems to be as great as that between quality and substance. It is confirmed because “one foot” is a quantity, and it is an accident, since it is present and absent without the corruption of the subject, etc.; therefore, the quantity of a substance is an accident. Also, according to the aforesaid,

Aristot. Democri.

light would be a body, because it is a long, broad, and deep quality; but that is against Aristotle, 2 De Anima, where he proves against Democritus that light is not a body.

¶ Furthermore, mutations are distinguished by their terms

to which they tend. 5 Physics. But augmentation is toward quantity, generation toward substance; therefore, substance and quantity are distinct. It is confirmed because alteration would thus be augmentation if quality were quantity, because alteration is toward extended qualities. It is confirmed secondly because there is movement toward quantity in itself, while generation is not movement in itself. 5 Physics. Therefore, quantity is not substance. Arguments are also made here regarding quantity in the Sacrament of the Altar, but because the shoemaker should not go beyond his last, I do not believe that matter is to be understood by the natural philosopher, unless the matter of transubstantiation is declared; but those things which purely concern quantity will be easily diluted from what has been said.

Scotus 1 2 3 4 5 6

¶ IV. I shall adduce reasons on the matter of the whole, and first that of Scotus where mentioned above, because otherwise there would be no difference between a whole that is one in itself and a whole by aggregation, which is its own parts. 8 Metaphysics. Secondly, because an accidental whole is less “one” than a whole in itself, and yet that is not its own parts. 7 Metaphysics. In this, a man is some “one” because whiteness is in the man. Thirdly, the whole itself is the terminus of generation in itself, but the terminus of generation in itself has its own proper existence; therefore, etc. A sign of this is that if the parts pre-existed, the whole would still be generated, as is evident in the resurrection. Fourthly, by the reason of the philosopher, 7 Metaphysics: a and b remain, and ab does not remain, therefore ab is really something other than a and b. Fifthly, because otherwise nothing would be really caused by intrinsic causes, namely matter and form, since these causes cause the composite, and the parts do not cause themselves. Sixthly, it would follow that there is no being that would have, in itself, a proper passion or proper operation of that species.

¶ Furthermore, because those things that found contradictory predicates are distinguished really, but the whole is composed of parts, the parts are not, and the parts constitute the whole, and the whole does not constitute the whole, therefore. Secondly, because then man would be eternal, for these are eternal, namely matter and form, and these are man; therefore, man is eternal. Thirdly, because those things that are the same as the same thing in number are the same among themselves, therefore matter and form will be the same among themselves, etc. Also, four

Albertilla Nyphus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

would be a thousand, just as Albertilla, whom Nyphus cites here in jest, introduces many trifles. ¶ Furthermore, let these be heaped into a pile. The whole is composed of parts, therefore it is not the parts; because nothing is composed of itself. Also, the parts are in the whole, and the same thing is not in itself; therefore. The parts also are prior to the whole. 5 Metaphysics. Now, nothing is prior to itself. Add that parts are in potency, 5 Metaphysics; the whole is in act. If an even number were odd, because the whole would be two halves and three thirds. And when man is distinguished from body, and distinguished from soul, it is a consequence that man is distinguished from matter and form, from the divided to the conjoined. It would also follow that the same thing is corruptible and incorruptible, because a Peacock would be matter and form; that is incorruptible, this is corruptible. The same thing would also be divisible and indivisible, as man. And one shield of my neighbors, the Ulmers, would be white and black, since one half is white and the other black. ¶ Let us add these things too, that thus it would stand that Eckard and Eckbert are distinguished in species, and thus man would be a genus; it is proved: these two are distinguished in species, with two matters and two forms of theirs being demonstrated, and these two are Eckard and Eckbert; therefore Eckard and Eckbert differ in species. It is confirmed because otherwise, two men would be four men; indeed, two men would be a whole army, as John of Rechberg did, putting to flight the soldiers of the imperial

Ioan. de Rechberg

cities. It is proved: if Eckebold and Eckuin are at Tübingen, let God take the matter of Eckebold, and the form...