Mathematical Mirror

a contradiction. Every contradiction, however, is according to the fact that it is a being; and those are impossible which are repugnant to being Beings, and it is repugnant for anything to be a Being that is not either God Himself, or according to God’s Ideas, just as it is repugnant for there to be another God, because he would be neither God Himself nor according to God’s Idea. All those things are called possible whose existence is not repugnant to existing outside [of Him], in the way that God necessarily exists, but creatures do so contingently. Or, to speak in another way: that there are proper Ideas only of those things which fall under the science of vision, but those things which fall under simple intelligence are understood not under proper Ideas, but under foreign ones. In the way that we conceive Entia rationis beings of reason/conceptual entities, not through proper intelligible species, but through the intelligible species of real beings. Either opinion can be easily defended without any distinction of truth. The former seems to be from the more recent writers, Matthias Aquarius in his disputation on Ideas, and Ferrarius to the 11th argument on the soul, where he also posits Ideas for those things which are evil, for the sake of their cognition. Simplicius, however, in 2 Physics, text 20, decides that there are not Ideas for all those things which exist outside subjectively and fall under the science of vision, for there are none of matter, nor of a composite, but of form only. The middle opinion seems to be the common sentiment of the Doctors; however, these things are disputed more broadly in Metaphysics. From what has been said, it is sufficiently gathered that the science of things falls most especially into God, and in the most perfect way, and is thus properly called a divine possession; and therefore, that our science, even if it be most shadowy, cannot have every denomination of divinity taken away from it, for the reason that if it does not attain the perfection of divine science, and with respect to it should be called a certain ignorance, yet since it is called a participant, it suffices if it is referred in any way to the first, which is said to possess science of itself. It is indeed referred, as far as divine and human science have a common object, in the knowing of which both are occupied, the former through primary causes, the latter led to some knowledge of the cause through effects, and by its benefit hunts for the awareness of the object. But what am I doing? By the participation of the divine, do I make riches, honors, pleasures, and sciences probable? Be it so; let us say they are not entirely devoid of all divinity; yet there is such a sum of vanity in them that if we weigh both on an equal scale, that which is of vanity in them appears to be of far greater weight than any divinity that underlies them. To whom are riches not snatched away by abuse? To what various fortunes are they exposed? How easily