Mathematical Mirror

Thus, he says that receiving is one thing and retaining is another, as is evident in these examples. And so it is in the organ of the common sense and the imagination. Yet, the whole virtue composed of these two—that is, the one which occupies the entire first cell—is called Phantasia Fantasy/Imagination. For from Book 2 On the Soul, On Sleep and Waking, and the book On Sense and the Sensible, it is evident that Phantasia and sensus communis are the same according to their subject, differing according to their being, as Aristotle says, and that Phantasia and Imaginatio are the same according to their subject, differing according to their being. Wherefore, Phantasia comprehends both virtues and differs from them only as the whole differs from a part. And therefore, since the common sense receives the species and the imagination retains it, there follows a complete judgment regarding the thing, which the Phantasia exercises.

CHAPTER III.

IT MUST BE KNOWN that the imagination, the common sense, and the particular sense do not judge by themselves except regarding twenty-nine sensible things: as vision judges of light and color; touch of the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry; hearing of sound; smell of odor; and taste of flavor. These are the nine proper sensible things, which are appropriated to their own senses as I have named them, of which no other particular sense can judge. There are, however, twenty other sensible things, namely: removal, position, corporeality, figure, continuous magnitude, identity, discretion or separation, number, motion, rest, roughness, smoothness, diaphanousness, thickness, shadow, obscurity, and beauty. Likewise, similarity and diversity in all of these and in all things composed of them. And besides these, there are some which are placed under one or some of these, such as arrangement under position, and writing and painting