Mathematical Mirror

rather [they are] the qualities of complexions, nay, the very substantial natures of things agreeable or contrary to one another, and therefore they produce strong species original: "species" — in scholastic philosophy, the representational image or "likeness" transmitted by an object to the senses which strongly affect the animam sensitiuam sensitive soul, so that it is moved by affections of fear, and horror, and flight or lingering. And these species or virtues coming from things, although they change and alter the sensus particulares particular senses, and the sensum communem common sense, and the imaginationem imagination through the air by which they pass, yet no part of these virtues of the soul judges regarding these; rather, it is necessary that there be a virtue of the sensitive soul that is far more noble and powerful, [namely] the æstimatio estimation or virtus estimatiua estimative virtue, as says Avic. Avicenna in the 1st [book] of De Anima On the Soul, which he says senses non-sensible forms concerning sensibilem materiam sensible matter. Sensible matter is called here that which is known by the particular senses and the common sense, such as the twenty-nine aforementioned things. And insensata forma insensible form is called that which is not perceived by those senses in themselves, because those are commonly called senses, although other virtutes animæ sensitiuæ virtues of the sensitive soul could just as well be called senses, if we wished to call them so, since they are parts of the sensitive soul. For every part of the sensitive soul can be called a sense, because in truth it is a sense and a virtus sensitiua sensitive virtue. Therefore, what is said—that substances are not sensed by sense—must be understood as [being sensed by] the particular sense, and the common [sense], and the imagination: but it can well be sensed by the estimation, which, although it is not called a sense, is nevertheless a part of the sensitive soul. But the estimation does not retain the species, although it receives it like the common sense, and therefore it needs another virtue in the last part of the postremę cellulæ rearmost cell [of the brain], which retains the species of the estimative [virtue] and is its chest and repository, just as the Imaginatio imagination is the chest of the common sense, and this is the virtus memoratiua memorial virtue, and this Avicenna says in the 2nd [book] of De Anima. The Cogitatio cogitation or virtus cogitatiua cogitative virtue is indeed in the middle cell, which is the mistress of the sensitive virtues, and in the place of reason in brutes, and therefore it is called Logistica the logical [faculty], that is, the rational [part], not because it uses reason, but because it is the ultimate perfection of brutes, just as reason [is] in man, and because the anima rationalis rational soul is immediately united to it in humans. And