Commentaries on Aristotle's On Interpretation

to be in the future, but that one does not say so. Therefore, it was necessary that whichever of these one said was true at that time. Nor does it make any difference whether some people have stated the contradiction or not; for it is clear that things are thus, even if this person has not affirmed and that person has not denied. For it will not be or not be because of the denying or affirming, nor will it be so in a thousand years any more than in any other amount of time. Therefore, if in all time it was in such a state that one could be said truly, it would be necessary for this to happen, and each of the things that occur would be in such a state that it would happen out of necessity. For when someone says truly that it will be, it cannot not happen; and it was always true to say of what has happened that it will be.

15 But if these things are not possible: for we see that there is a beginning of future things, and that from the fact that we deliberate and do something, and because it is entirely possible in those things which are not always in act to be and not to be—in which both happen, both to be and not to be—therefore [it is also possible] both to happen and not to happen. And many things are manifest to us as being in such a state, as that it is possible for this garment to be cut, and it will not be cut, but will wear out first. Similarly, it is also possible for it not to be cut. For it would not wear out first unless it were possible for it not to be cut. Therefore, in other productions too, whatever are spoken of in terms of potentiality, it is manifest that not all things either are or happen by necessity. But some indeed are either way, and neither the affirmation nor the negation is more [true]; others...