BOOK VII. i. 4-8

had formed a general idea of these circumstances, I proceeded to consider them quite as much from my opponent’s point of view as from my own.

5 The first point which I set myself to determine (it is easy enough to state, but is still all-important) was what each party desired to establish and then what means he was likely to adopt to that end. My method was as follows: I considered what the prosecutor would say first. His point must either be admitted or controversial; if admitted, no question could arise in this connection.

6 I therefore passed to the answer of the defense and considered it from the same standpoint; even there the point was sometimes one that was admitted. It was not until the parties ceased to agree that any question arose. Take for example the following case: “You killed a man.” “Yes, I killed him.” Agreed; I pass to the defense, which has to produce the motive for

7 the homicide. “It is lawful,” he urges, “to kill an adulterer with his paramour.” Another admitted point, for there is no doubt about the law. We must look for a third point where the two parties are at variance. “They were not adulterers,” says the prosecution; “They were,” says the defense. Here then is the question at issue; there is a doubt as to the facts, and it is therefore a question of conjecture. A legal issue concerning facts.

8 Sometimes even the third point may be admitted; it is granted that they were adulterers. “But,” says the accuser, “you had no right to kill them, for you were an exile” or “had forfeited your civil rights.” The question is now one of law. On the other hand, if when the prosecution says, “You killed them,” the defense at once replies, “I did not,” the issue is raised without more delay.