The Golden Ass (Metamorphoses)

Page 112

Header: Regarding Article II.

DIFFICULTIES.

See Saint Thomas, Question 2, Article 3.

1. Objection 1. If God existed, there would be no evil in the world: But evil exists: Therefore, God does not exist. The major premise is proven by the fact that God is the supreme good, and consequently His goodness is infinite: but that which possesses infinite goodness occupies all things in such a way that it leaves no room for evil: therefore, etc.

2. Objection 2. Multiplicity is not to be posited in things where one thing can be explained by fewer principles: but all things that appear to happen in the world can happen through other principles, assuming that God does not exist: for those things that are natural are reduced to nature as to their principle; and those things that happen by design are reduced to human reason or will: Therefore it is not necessary to posit that God exists.

3. Objection 3. God appears to be something infinite. But no body is infinite: Therefore God does not exist.

4. Objection 4. A multitude of things is found in the world: But a multitude cannot be reduced to one primary being, but to a multitude of principles: Therefore there is not one God.

5. Objection 5. A diversity of things according to genus and species is found in the world: but this diversity cannot proceed from a simple and one principle: Therefore God does not exist.

6. Objection 6. Nothing can act beyond its own species: but God, if He existed, would be of a different species from created things: Therefore He could not produce them.

SOLUTION TO THE DIFFICULTIES.

Regarding the first.

Response: with Saint Augustine in his Enchiridion Manual/Handbook, chapter 11, God is so good and omnipotent that He would in no way allow any evil to exist in His works, unless He were so omnipotent and good that He could bring good even out of evil. It therefore pertains to the infinite goodness of God that He permits evils to occur, and draws good from them: from which it is clear that one does not argue from the existence of evil that God does not exist, but rather that He does: for if God were not a provider and one ordering the universe toward the good, goods would not follow from evils in such an orderly way, as often happens.

Regarding the second.

Response: by denying the minor premise: for, since nature acts for a determined end by the direction of some superior agent, it is necessary to reduce those things that happen by nature to God, as to the first cause: likewise, it is necessary to reduce those things that happen by design to some superior cause, which is not human reason and will; because these are mutable and defective; yet all things that move and are defective must be reduced to some primary, immobile, and per se necessary principle, as has been shown.

Regarding the third.

Response: by conceding the minor premise: for God is not a body, but a most simple spirit; and although He is not infinite in bulk original: "mole", He is nonetheless infinite in perfection and power.

Regarding the fourth.

Response: to this and to the fifth, that the multitude and diversity of things cannot indeed proceed from a simple principle insofar as it acts by the necessity of nature; however, it can, insofar as it acts through intellect and will, as will be said shortly.

Regarding the fifth.

It is clear from what has been said.

Regarding the sixth.

Response: the major premise is understood regarding a univocal agent, which produces an effect of the same species as itself, but not regarding an equivocal agent, which produces an effect of a different species, as God is with respect to creatures.