Collected Works (1961) - Page 7

The intention of philosophy.

The Logic of Avicenna begins.

Chapter on entering into the sciences.

A large ornamental drop-cap 'D' contains a woodcut illustration of two robed scholars engaged in a discussion within a vaulted interior.

We say that the intention of philosophy is to comprehend the truth of all things as far as it is possible for a human to comprehend.

Division of philosophy into speculative and active.

Things that exist either have their being not from our will or work, or they have their being from our will and work. The knowledge of things of the first type is called speculative philosophy, but the knowledge of things of the second type is called active philosophy.

What is the end of the speculative and what of the active.

The end of speculative philosophy is nothing but the perfection of the soul, so that it may know. The end of practical philosophy is not only to know, but to know what one must do and to do it. Therefore, the end of speculative philosophy is the apprehension of a proposition that is not a work; the end of practical philosophy is the knowledge of a proposition that is in work. Whence speculative philosophy is more worthy to be compared to science.

Speculative philosophy is more worthy by the name of science than practical.

Definition of things which are the subject of speculative science.

Things that exist whose being is not from our will or work are divided into two according to the first member: into things that are mixed with motion, and things that are not mixed with motion.

Things that are mixed with motion are divided into two: for either they are things that have no being unless it is possible for them to be mixed with motion, such as humanity, squaring, and doubling; or they are things that have being without this. Those things that have no being unless it is possible for them to be mixed with motion are again divided into two: for either they are such that they can neither be nor be understood without their proper matter, such as human or equine form; or they are such that they can be understood without matter, but not exist without it, such as the squaring [of a circle], for to understand which it is not at all necessary to assign it to any specific type of matter, nor to be considered according to any condition of motion.

Things that are mixed with motion (and have being without it) are such as identity, unity, multitude, and causality.

The truth of things that can be stripped from motion is twofold.

The truth of things that can be stripped from motion is twofold: either it is a necessary truth, such as God and the intelligence; or the truth of these is not necessary, but they are such that this is not impossible for them, such as the condition of identity, unity, causality, and number, which is multitude.

Things that can be stripped from motion (to which motion is not nevertheless impossible) can be considered in two ways.

And these are either considered according to what they are in themselves: and their consideration is not varied in that they are stripped [of matter], but they will then be of the whole consideration that is in things because they are not in matter, since these, by virtue of what they are, are not in matter. Or they are considered according to the fact that it happens to them not to have being except in matter. But this also is divided into two: for either because of this circumstance, it is impossible for them to be understood except in respect to special matter and motion, such as the consideration of 'one' as it is air or fire, and of 'many' as they are elements, and of [heat] as it is heat or cold, and of the second intelligible as it is the soul, which is the principle of the motion of the body, even though separated from it, it could exist by itself. And although this does not happen except in comparison to matter and the admixture of motion, nevertheless, sometimes their conditions are understood and certified without consideration of proper matter and motion. The aforementioned consideration is thus of aggregation, segregation, multitude, division, and the discovery of roots; and as in other

He summarizes the part, from the aforementioned division of speculative philosophy

conditions that follow number; for these follow number, and they are in the human intellect, or in existing mobile things, divided, segregated, and aggregated. But the intellect of these sometimes can be abstracted in some way, so that it is not necessary to assign special matters to them.

These are the sciences of philosophy in the second summary

Knowledge of number as it is number does not pertain to disciplinary science

The parts of the sciences are either speculation concerning the conception of those things that are with matter, because they have being in motion and existence and depend on the matter of their proper species, or speculation according to how they are separated from these in the intellect alone, or according to how they are separated from these in being and intellect. The first part of the division is natural science. The second is pure disciplinary [mathematical] science and the science of number—that is, the one that is better known; for knowledge about the matter of number as it is number does not pertain to disciplinary science. The third part is divine science. After those things that are natural are taken in these three ways, these are the physical and speculative sciences.

Division of practical [philosophy] into politics, economics, and ethics.

Practical philosophy pertains either to the science of propositions by which the common human consortium is ordered, and it is called the government of the city and is civil science; or by which the family consortium is ordered and it is called domestic organization; or by which the way of one man is ordered according to the goodness of his own soul, and it is called moral science.

Moral truth is proven by the testimony of divine law.

The truth of all these is universally certified by proof and the testimony of law. But each of these is certified individually from divine law. Therefore, the end of speculative philosophy is the recognition of truth; the end of practical philosophy is the knowledge of goodness.

Against the end of practice being work, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics II, text 3, regarding reason. He answers that the end of practice is knowledge ordered toward work.

a The being of things has three respects and a triple being: and this is what others say in other words regarding triple being: 1. not in the thing. 2. in the thing. 3. after the thing. b Supposition of predication: validity and principality of the questions of things as they are in the intellect. And what is asked cannot be given by real positions nor argumentations.

The essences of things either are in the things themselves, or they are in the intellect; whence they have three respects. One respect of essence is according to what it is not related to any third being, nor to that which follows them by virtue of what it is. Another respect is according to what it is in these singulars. And another according to what it is in the intellect. b And then the accidents follow it which are proper to this being of its own, such as supposition, predication, universality, particularity in predicating, essentiality, accidentality in predicating, and the rest of those things which you will learn later. In those things that are outside, there is no essentiality nor accidentality at all: nor is there any complex or incomplex [thing], nor proposition, nor argumentation, nor other things of this kind.

These are compounded? in the joined things.

When we wish to consider these so that we may know them, it is necessary to collect them in the intellect; and then the conditions that are proper only to the intellect necessarily happen to them, especially when we aim by thinking to apprehend the unknown from the known.

Necessity of logic.

Things are not unknown except in relation to us. The condition of that which happens to things from the fact that we are invited through them from the unknown to the known is a condition and an accident that happens to them in the intellect, even though they have being apart from this.

Science either in itself or used in singulars.

Therefore, of necessity, there is a need for science to know those conditions, how many they are and what kind they are, and how this accident follows.

How logic is not a part of philosophy, but an instrument for catching philosophy in one way.

But because this consideration is not a consideration of things as they have being in some manner of the two aforementioned modes of being, but rather according to this it is useful for apprehending the condition of those two beings, then—according to the degree that philosophy is treating, dividing, and inquiring into things as they have being, and they are divided into the two aforementioned beings—this science, according to him, will not be a part of philosophy, but according to the degree that it is useful for this, it will be, according to him, an instrument in philosophy.

How logic is a part of philosophy, taking philosophy in another way.

According to whom, however, philosophy is that which treats of every speculative inquiry and every mode, this science, according to him, is a part of philosophy and an instrument of the other philosophies in another way.