Logic

Removing doubt.

¶ In this doctrine, one must not consider the composition that exists according to hearing, since its part does not signify a part of the intellect. For example, when we say "master" original: "dominus", we do not intend to signify "do" or "minus"; for these syllables are not of complex words, but of incomplex ones.

What the description of an incomplex word is according to the ancients.

¶ What is found in the doctrine of the ancients concerning the description of incomplex words is this, namely, that they are incomplex, whose parts do not signify anything.

A refutation of that description according to some.

¶ Many refute this description, saying that one ought to add that they are incomplex, whose parts do not signify anything of the intellect of the whole; because it happens sometimes that parts of incomplex words signify some intellects, but they are not parts of the intellect of the whole.

Defense of that description.

¶ I, however, maintain that this refutation was an error, and that this addition was not necessary for supplementing, but for explaining.

A word signifies nothing of itself.

¶ For a word signifies nothing at all from itself; otherwise, every word would have a due signification which it would never vary. It would not signify according to the pleasure of the speaker, such as when someone imposes a word to signify a certain intellect, as when "dog" is said for a barking animal, and this is its signification; then he imposes it to signify something else, such as fish. And this is its signification. Likewise, when a word is empty of signification at the time of imposition, it will remain non-signifying.

A word or voice lacking a signified object is not a word.

¶ And according to many authors, it will not even be a word. For a word is not a voice according to the understanding of many logicians, unless it is signifying; and since it is so, he who uttered an incomplex word did not intend its part to separately signify a part of the intellect of the whole nature, and he intended its part to signify something else that it is accustomed to signify, and it pleased him. Then that part is not signifying in any way, since it is a part of it in effect.

The part of an incomplex expression, as an act, signifies nothing, though perhaps it signifies as a part in potentiality.

¶ If, however, it is in potentiality, then perhaps it will signify something when they add to it some designated relation; that is, the will of the speaker to signify something through it exists there. But it will not signify anything at all while it is a part of an incomplex word, but only when it is a word by itself. When it is a part, it will not signify anything in any way.

Consideration of simple things precedes the consideration of complex things.

¶ A word is either complex or incomplex. Now you know that it is prior to consider the incomplex before the complex.

It implies the distinction of an incomplex voice into univocal and equivocal.

¶ Then the intention of the incomplex will either be such that it does not prohibit the intellect, from the fact that many are understood to agree in it equally, such that each one of them is said to be it equally, just as this which we call "man" has an intention in the soul that accompanies Socrates and Plato and the rest in one way, of which each one is a man. Indeed, just as the word "sun" and "moon," each signifies an intention in which the intellect does not prohibit many from agreeing, although it is not in act.

From which it follows that sun, moon, and the like are predicable of many.

¶ But this is prohibited from another cause, not from that which is understood from the word itself, just as the moon or its intention is one, so that it is not prohibited in the intellect for many to agree in it, namely, in that one thing which is understood of it.

As if to say: this is impeded from the part of the nature of the thing.

¶ As in that which we say "Socrates," for although many might agree, they do not agree except according to its hearing; but one intention is impossible, so that one be posited in which many agree. For one of its intentions is the substance or essence of this singular, but the intellect prohibits the essence or substance of this singular from being attributed to another. Sometimes, however, when "Socrates" is said, his essence is not sought, but some of his properties in which many agree. In this

part of the division, although they are not prohibited from agreeing regarding its hearing, it is nevertheless prohibited from being in its one common intention in which they agree.

It implies the distinction of an incomplex voice that is univocal into universal and particular.

¶ The first part of the division is called universal, the second, however, particular. You know that there are many things in words after the manner of the first part, and in many intellects that are after the manner of the first part, and this is the intention about which that which is understood in the soul is not prohibited from having a comparison of similarity to many things.

Logic, as such, does not have to care about the existence of universals.

¶ Do not worry, as a logician, about how this comparison exists, and whether the intellect, from the fact that it is one (in which many agree), has existence in the things themselves that agree in it, or has an existence separated outside by itself beyond the existence it has in one intellect, or how it has it in your intellect. The consideration of these things belongs to another doctrine, or to two doctrines.

¶ Now, therefore, you know that one word is complex, another is incomplex, and that the incomplex is either universal or particular. You also know that we must postpone the treatise on complex things.

There is no occupation for science regarding singular words.

¶ Know also that we are not occupied with the treatise of singular words and their intentions; for they are infinite and cannot be numbered, and even if they were finite, knowing them as they are particular does not confer upon us the perfection of wisdom, nor do we arrive through them at the end of wisdom, as you will know later in the book of wisdom.

The consideration of this book is about universal words.

¶ But what we must consider is the consideration of the universal word; for you know that a universal word is not universal unless it has some comparison, either in being or in true opinion, to the particulars of which it is predicated.

Predication is twofold: univocal and denominative.

¶ But predication is done in two ways, for it is either univocally, as this which we said: "Socrates is a man," for "man" is predicated of Socrates truly and univocally; or denominatively, as "whiteness" of a man. For it is said that a man is "white" and "having whiteness," and it is not said that he is "whiteness." If, however, it happens that a "white body" and a "white color" are spoken of, the definition of this predicate does not predicate of the subjects equally. Our intention here, however, is only about that which is predicated univocally.

¶ We will therefore enumerate the parts of the universal according to how it is compared to particulars univocally, and gives them a name and a definition. Many things that we find, however, make the word not proceed at first by the customary way in the division of words, but we will return to that later.

¶ We will say that everything that is has an essence by which it is what it is, and by which is its necessity, and by which is its being.

Concerning the essence of a thing and how some is simple, and some is composite.

¶ The essence of each thing is one; but that which is one absolute is not that which is from many intellects, from which joined together a single essence may proceed. The example of this is not found in sensible things; you must therefore now believe in its existence. Sometimes, however, they will be one thing not absolute, whose existence and truth is composed from things and intentions from which joined together the essence of the thing proceeds. The example of this is man. For it is necessary that man be a substance having dimensions in space in which length, breadth, and thickness occur. And because of this, it is necessary that man be one having a soul by which he is nourished, senses, and moves by will; and besides this, that he be apt to understand intelligibles and to know arts and teach them, unless he is prohibited from the outside, not from the part of humanity, to which all things that agree by the coming together of all agree to be one, which is the essence of man.

Concerning the essence of a composite thing, which is composite and even more so when it is distinguished into singulars.

¶ Then, however, other intentions are mixed in with it, and other causes on account of which each of the human singulars becomes, on account of which each is distinguished.