Part One

...what is singular from another: just as that which is short is not that which is long, or that which is white is not that which is black. None of these is the human being original: "hō" i.e., "homo". For if that singular thing did not claim this or claim the other turn of it, it would necessarily be corrupted on account of this. Yet there are such things that follow and accompany it.

Humanity is the essence of this singular human being.

¶ However, the truth of its being is nothing but humanity: therefore, that which is each singular thing is from its humanity; but the special is acquired from the entity and quality and other things. ¶ And it also has other properties besides humanity; but the special is acquired from the entity and quality just as in humanity: if they are true properties of the common human, such as that which is rational, that is, having a rational soul; and such as that which is naturally risible capable of laughter. Just as that which is rational is one of those things from which, when combined, a human is composed; so that which is risible is naturally...

Risibility is necessarily considered in relation to those things from which humanity consists.

...a certain thing that, since humanity is composed of those things of which it consists, it was necessary to happen and to accompany it. For when a human is made from the conjunction of a rational soul with its matter, it was fit to be animated; that being animated follows so that there is an affection of laughing in the matter; just as it was fit for other affections, such as being ashamed, and weeping, and admiring, and perceiving art and wisdom. None of these, however, is a habit; and through those things, the subject was then made fit for receiving the rational soul. Therefore, the habit of the rational soul proceeds, and the habit of humanity is perfected through it; and these things follow it. For when you consider humanity, these are necessary. Now, therefore, it is clear from this that this is the true essence of a thing, and here are the properties: from some of which, and from others, the truth of the thing consists. ¶ Some, therefore, of these are accidents that do not accompany the words and universals in being that signify the being of one thing, or of many; and those signify those things which are answered to "what is it," not in another way. ¶ But if they signify those things which must precede in being to the essence of a thing, in such a way that from their conjunction the being of the thing arises (of which one alone is not the being of the thing, nor the word that signifies the truth of the being of the whole thing, but a part of it), it ought to be called an essential word; since they are answered to "what is it." It does not, however, signify a property that is beyond those two, whether it be common or not, the words themselves are called accidental; and its intention is called an accidental intention. ¶ For concerning matter, it must be treated here, if it is necessary that the intention of a universal word be containing the intention of a word signifying "what the being of a thing is," such as the common which contains the proper, or not. ¶ For this which we call an essential word signifies a word whose intention has a comparison to the essence of a thing. However, essence is not compared to the essence of a thing; for it is not compared to anything except that which is not itself. Therefore, because it is thought that a substantial word is more convenient, it is better that it contains the intentions constituting the being of the thing, and that a word signifying the being of the thing not be substantial; as "human" is not substantial to the human, but "animal" and "rational" are substantial to the human. ¶ But if this name "human" is not posited as substantial to the human, from the fact that it is a human, but to each of the singulars: then it is necessary that it be compared because of the substantiality to the truth of the singular, and this is also "human"; or that it be called a collation which is singular, and then it will not be the whole thing, but a part of it which is according to this, that it is a conjunction; and it will happen that neither animal, nor rational, nor human, nor anything of this sort is substantial to each singular alone. ¶ Accidental things also...

Essential word what is.

Accidental and accidental intention what is.

Doubt.

Solution.

Comparison is not to itself.

Accidentals sometimes will be substantial.

...just as its color, and that it is the son of Plato, and things of this kind: sometimes they will be substantial, when they will be parts constituting the composite; and then "human" will not be more substantial to the singular than this, and these opinions lead us to this: that the substantial may not be containing whatever signifies being. ¶ However, this which we call substantial, although according to the nature of singular speech it may have a comparable intention, nevertheless, according to the pleasure of the logicians, it signifies another intention. And this is that a universal word is that which signifies an intention, whose comparison to singulars is such that when it is thought not to be the substance of those particulars, it will not have being; not that the substance of those particulars ought to be destroyed first, so that such a destruction can be thought of; but because from its destruction follows the destruction of those things. Moreover, it is the same whether, when destroyed, it be the truth of science, or whether it be about that which is necessary to the truth of science by which it is constituted; for this and that is called substantial. But if it were not so, but it were possible in being or in opinion that the subject remains with the predicate destroyed; or it is not possible in being, but its destruction is not the cause of the destruction of the subject; and this is not possible in being, for that destruction does not happen unless the subject is first destroyed in itself, in such a way that its being destroyed is not the cause of the destruction of the subject, but it is an accident. ¶ But that which is destroyed in being is such as standing or sitting, which are of those things which are quickly destroyed: or such as youth, which is eventually destroyed: or such as the anger of a tranquil person, which is easily removed: and such as manners which are easily taken away. ¶ But that which is destroyed in opinion, not in being, is such as the blackness of an Ethiopian. ¶ But that which is not removed unless the cause is first removed is such as that to which a human is naturally fit, which it is possible to be removed from a human in being. If, however, the potency is destroyed, humanity will be destroyed: not because the destruction of the natural aptitude for laughing is the cause of the destruction of humanity, but because it does not happen that the risible is destroyed unless humanity has been destroyed beforehand. The risibility itself is not the cause of positing humanity, but humanity is the cause of positing it. ¶ It is clear, therefore, the diversity that is between the comparison of animal and rational, and also of human to singulars; and between the comparison of accidents to these; for the former being destroyed, the singulars must be destroyed; but because of the destruction of the latter, the singular should not be destroyed. Out of these, however, there are some that are destroyed, and some that it is impossible to be destroyed unless the singular is destroyed. And since it is so in the thing, then the substantial will be the container of whatever signifies the being of a thing. ¶ Now, however, it is manifest that a universal incomplete word: one is substantial which signifies being, and another is substantial which does not signify being, and another is accidental.

Difference between substantial word and etc.

Accidentals separable according to being.

Accidentals separable according to opinion.

Proper passions cannot be removed except as aptitudes; but only that which pertains to their acts.

How, with the potentiality destroyed, some species which is its passion is destroyed and that species.

Epilogue.

Substantial double: one that signifies being; one that does not signify being.

Opinion of others on the distinction of the substantial from the accidental.

A large decorative initial 'I' features a stylized figure entwined within floral and architectural patterns.

They have already said in distinguishing the substantial from the accidental that the substantial is constitutive: the accidental, however, is not constitutive; but they do not discern in what way it is constitutive and in what way it is not constitutive. They also said that it is impossible for the substantial to be thought destroyed while the subject remains; the accidental, however, it is possible to be thought destroyed while the subject remains.