Logic

subordinate being is twofold.
Signifying universal being.
Signifying mixed being.

in a way: or it is not suitable. However, that which signifies being is: either what signifies the being of many things that do not differ substantially: or it signifies the being of many things whose essences differ substantially. An example of the first is the name of the sun, when it is called "sun," this designates it; or the name of a human, when Socrates or Hippocrates original: "Hypocras" is called "human." An example of the second is the signification of this name, "animal," which, if someone asks who they are regarding a horse and a donkey together, will respond that they are animals. For this name signifies their truth entirely, namely that which is asked for regarding their collection, and the certainty which they have in common is sought.

Difference between subordinate universal modes.

¶ The difference, however, between these two modes is this: the first mode is that which signifies the being of a collection, and then the name of each one signifies the substantial truth that Socrates and Hippocrates have in its entirety. It neither exceeds it nor is it left behind by it, except for what is proper to each one of the accidental properties, as you already know from the aforementioned. ¶ Regarding the second mode, however, you know that animality alone is significant of the being of a human and a horse, each per se in itself; for from that alone, neither of them is what it is; nor do they exceed this through accidental differences, but through substantial ones. Whatever they have in common regarding being, the name "animal" signifies; "sensible," however, signifies a part of the whole which the signification of this name "animal" encompasses. It is, therefore, a part of the perfection of their truth in which they agree, though not entirely; the disposition of "rational" in comparison to "human" is similar. ¶ Someone here could say that "animal" signifies nothing that "sensible" does not signify; for just as there is no animal except a body having a soul, so "sensible" is nothing but a body having a soul.

Objection.
Solution.

¶ We answer to the contrary, saying that what we mean by saying a name signifies some intentio intention/concept is not in the way he understands it, namely, that whatever a name signifies must necessarily be the same as its signification. For you know that
It is not necessary that whatever a name signifies is the signification of that name.

when this name "mobile" signifies, it is necessary for a mover to be there; and when this name "roof" signifies, it is necessary for a foundation to be there; and yet, because of this, we do not say that this name "mobile" signifies, or that a mover is understood from it, nor is a foundation understood or signified from this name "roof"; for the sense
The signification of a name properly regards its first imposition.

of the name’s signification is that the name belongs to that intention which comes from the first imposition. Thus, even if there were another intention joined to the first from the outside, which the intellect perceives when it perceives the first, the name will not for that reason be significant of it according to the first imposition. Sometimes there will be one intention predicable of whatever the intention of another name is predicated of, just as the intention of "body" is with the intention of "sensible," and with the intention of "mobile." For the intention that division signifies is of two modes: principal and secondary. The principal is, for example, what we say when "animal" signifies the conjunction of a body possessing the nature of the sensible. The secondary is, for example, such as that which signifies "body." For its intellect is included in the intellect of animality; therefore, that which signifies animality necessarily contains the intellect of "body," not because it helps it from the outside. Therefore, this will be a true and principal signification, as well as a secondary and an extrinsic signification. For when a word signifies something it signifies, it is known internally, and something adheres to it externally, which is not held from the signification of the word, neither as content, nor as principal, nor as equal. ¶ If, however, we wish to encompass and acquire this whole, we will say that

Threefold signification of words.
Of equality of containment.
Of accompaniment.

the signification of words is in three modes: for there is signification by equality, where "animal" signifies a body having a sensible soul; and signification by containment, such as the signification of "body" by "animal"; and signification by accompaniment, as in the signification of a "foundation" from a "roof." ¶ And when this is the case, we return to what we were saying: because from "sensible" is understood that which has sense, and by "animal" we understand that it is a body having a soul; therefore, the signification of "body" and "sensible" is a signification of accompaniment. Sometimes, however, according to the pleasure of the logicians, they interject that it is a body having a sensible soul. Therefore, its signification according to the whole truth is a signification of equality, and to its parts, a signification of containment; "sensible," however, according to equality is only a perfect thing, but it signifies the whole and other parts only according to accompaniment. ¶ Therefore, when we say this word signifies, we do not understand this mode of signification, as has already been shown, which is the word signifying being; from this mode the aforementioned question is removed. ¶ A word substantial to something, which does not signify the being of that to which it is substantial, neither as genus nor as species, it is impossible for it to be what is more general than common substantials; for then it would signify the common being in another way. It is therefore less common than that, but it is suitable for this, so that through it, the contents under it may differ among themselves; it is therefore suitable for a "what-like" quale quid quality/what-kind; therefore, substantial being that does not signify the being of the thing is significant of a "what-like."

Objection.

¶ If someone says, however, that what is suitable for a "what-like" is also suitable for a "what" quid what/essence. For "sensible," even if it is denied to signify the being of a human, horse, and ox in the manner of a genus or species, it is not, however, denied to signify being common to one who hears, sees, and touches. ¶ Therefore, it is not necessary for the substantial to be divided into that which answers to "what" and that which answers to "what-like," such that the one does not contain the other; for it is not established that whatever signifies "what it is" does not signify "what-like it is"; whence they are compelled to concede what you said others ought to say.

Solution.

¶ We respond to that which will be solved when we know not to deny that that which signifies "what they are" also signifies "what-like they are," because we concede this; for we do not deny it, except that (for example): "sensible" is a signifier of special being. For "sensible" is, like "animal," substantial to human, horse, and ox, since "sensible" is a common substantial to many to which "animal" is a common substantial; and we do not deny anything except that
It does not imply that the substantial is accidental with respect to different things.

they agree in substantiality, yet they differ in that "animal" is per se significant of common being to those to which both are substantial; for our intention is that it is not accidental in what we say, that the substantial is not accidental to that to which it is substantial. ¶ But the second [objection] is not solved by [saying] that we do not understand [it as] signifying "what-like," but [rather as] suitable for "what-like" without "what," such that its signification is nothing but an intention intrinsic to it in the name signifying general or special being, but rather the constitutive intention by which they differ. When, however, we say it signifies "what-like," we understand this intention.

Doubt.

¶ If, however, someone doubts and considers what kind of predication "sensible" is of the hearing, seeing, and touching; whether one ought to respond about it, or "what," or not; and how it is possible that it be answered as "what," when these will be species of the sensible and some diverse difference; then "sensible" will not be predicated of them as that which