Logyce

The vulgar division of the five things.

We do not, however, understand as "common" that which is predicated "in what" original: "in quid," referring to essential predication in response to a question asked of many things as to what they are. Next, we will discuss how those things that are predicated "in what" differ in community and property. For some of them are common, and some are more common. Among the predicables predicated "in what," that which is more common is the genus, and the less common is the species; and when a species is found, it may or may not be the genus of another species. And this division shows us five things clearly, and the nature of the species, according to the common intention, is contained within it. The second intention of the species, indeed, is included within it in some way, but in the first division, this was not so.

¶ The vulgar division of these five related things, however, pertains to the first division. For it is divided thus: every incomplex singular name signifies either one thing or many. That which signifies one thing is a singular name; that which signifies many signifies them either as differing in species or in number. That which signifies many differing in species is either substantial or accidental. If it is substantial, it is predicated either "in what" or "in what kind." That which signifies many differing in species "in what" is called the genus, that which signifies "in what kind" is the difference, and that which is accidental is the common accident. Next, it is said that that which signifies many differing in number is either predicated "in what"—and thus it is the species—or it is predicated "in what kind"—and thus it is the property.

Reprehension of that vulgar division.

¶ This division of theirs, however, does not include the species according to its relative intention, nor the difference insofar as it is a difference, for nothing is contained in it concerning differences except that which is predicated of many species. The nature of the definition is not good, or it suffers from the fact that it is a difference, for not every difference is as will be shown later. ¶ If, however, they had considered what you will know later, they could not be criticized; but you will know that they neither considered nor perceived this, and therefore we cannot excuse them, although perhaps the first of the doctors Likely referring to Porphyry or Aristotle, whose works form the basis of the Isagoge. did consider it. ¶ And in this division, they did not distinguish between the property and the difference that only the species possesses. ¶ And they excluded the property that is the property of a middle species and its counterpart. For they did not assign the property insofar as it is a property of a species, but insofar as it is a property of the most specific species, just as they did not assign a species except the most specific one.

The vulgar definition of the most specific species.

Let us now certify the vulgar descriptions of the species, saying that the species (insofar as the species is not referred to the genus) is perceived by such a definition: that it is that which is predicated of many differing in number "in what," in which neither the genus nor the common accident agrees with it; for each one of them is predicated of many differing in species, but not of many differing in number. ¶ This, however, that it ought to be predicated of many differing in number, must be understood as: of number alone. For unless it is understood thus, from the fact that it is predicated of many differing in number, it would not be prohibited from being predicated of many differing in species, for that which is predicated of many differing in number is predicated of something that is predicated of many differing in species. Wherefore the property of this name does not belong to the species, but only to that which is predicated, unless that which is predicated of many differing in species is excluded from that which is understood by this, and this is how the genus and the accident differ from the species, or by how it is discerned

But this common thing is not predicated of divine species, such as the sun and the like; therefore, etc. Solve this.

Note the limitation of the definition of the most specific species, the change of which was authored by Avicenna, as Albert narrates in his final works.

from the species, namely those things that are predicated of many differing in species. ¶ An example of this definition is that which is divided into two equal parts; for it is the difference of the even insofar as number is concerned, but sometimes it is said of a line, a surface, and a body. For "even" is not only that which is divided into two equal parts, but when "number" is added to it, which is as it were its genus, it will be the property of the even. ¶ But it does not discern by this the species from the difference that is proper to the species, such as "rational," namely, having the power of discursive thought; for the human alone has this. For that which is predicated of an angel is of another intention, in which the human does not agree with the angel. ¶ Some wordy men, however, can exclude from this definition (according to this mode of discerning the species from the difference). This mode is: that it should be said that by the nature of the species according to this intention, it ought not to be predicated except of many differing in number, but the nature of the difference ought not to be this. And this mode is excepted, but by that which is predicated "in what," the species is absolved from the difference, and also it differs from the property, for the property is not predicated "in what." ¶ Therefore this description is correctly assigned, which is not accompanied except by the intention that states the most specific species. ¶ The species, however, insofar as it is referred to the genus, has two descriptions, of which one is this: by which it is said that it is placed under the genus; the other, that it is that of which the genus is predicated "in what." ¶ We must, however, consider well, saying that if by "placed under the genus" it is understood that it is more proper than it in predication—just as that which is predicated of a part of that of which it is predicated is said to be that under which it is—if so, then the singular, the species, the difference, and the property agree in this. ¶ If, however, it is understood "placed under the genus" as that which is a species only, and not a singular, then it is understood that it is not given from the signification of the name, and besides this, the difference, the species, and the property agree in this. ¶ If, however, it is understood by "placed under the genus" that it is more closely joined to it in that middle end, then the singular is excluded, but not the property and the difference. ¶ If, however, it is understood that it is joined to it not merely in common order, but in the order of intention, then the property is also excluded, but not the difference. ¶ If, however, it is understood that it is that in whose nature the common—that is, that which is superior—is contained in its signification, this description will be appropriated to the species; for the genus is not in the nature of the definition, nor of the property, but is as it were their seed, and it does not enter into their essence; and its comparison to them is like the comparison of a thing following necessarily, and not a comparison of that which enters their substance, as you already know. This name, "placed under the genus," however, does not signify this intention exposed in so many ways, neither according to imposition nor according to use; for I do not remember having found in any place in the books of the author of this art that this name ought to be understood thus. ¶ The second description is this: that the species is that of which its genus is predicated "in what"; or it is said thus: that it is that of which its genus is predicated "in what." ¶ Conversely, if one understands "predicated in what" as we have already shown, it is necessary that something be added that is that of which its genus is thus predicated "in what," and this will be the property of the species; for the genus is not predicated of the difference "in what" in any way, just as it is not of the property and the accident; for the being of the individual is not perfected by the genus alone. ¶ If, however, from this it is understood that a difference is understood between it and the difference and the property and the accident, between it and the singular there is no difference unless it is contained in it that it is a universal of this kind.

By what the most specific species is defined from the difference, the opinion of others.

Proper opinion and this.

Description of the common species which refers to the genus.

How that description is to be understood: species is that which is placed under the genus.

Fifth understanding of that description.

The genus is as it were the seed of the difference and the property, but it does not enter their substance.

How the second definition of the common species is to be understood, where many false understandings are excluded.