Logyce Logic

Dñia Difference is more proper than others.

the starting point of being proceeds: this, therefore, will be that by which the individuals of that same species differ.

How the difference dñia is said to be more proper than others.

¶ The difference, however, which is called "more proper" is the constitutive element of the species. When it is joined to the nature of the genus, it produces that species; and thereafter, everything that accompanies and happens to it follows and is added. This is the substantial nature of the genus that is constituted in the being of the species; and this gives being, distinguishes, and designates it: just as rationality is for man, which differs from the rest of the things that agree with it. For the first does not occur to the nature of the genus, but it arrives and completes it; the others, however, do not arrive at the common nature except after this has arrived, and it adapts and prepares it for all things that happen and accompany it. For they do not arrive or happen except after this property, which is like rationality for man.

¶ The power that is called the "rational soul," because it is joined to the animal matter, becomes rational and capable of science and arts, such as navigation and agriculture; and it is also adapted for wondering and observing on account of things to be wondered at, and for weeping, blushing, and doing the other things that humans do. Not that from the conjunction of any of these with animality this animal has the aptitude by which it becomes rational, but that the common aptitude and common human power is the reason for which it is called rational. Those other things are its accidents and their consequences. ¶ This, moreover, can be known and certified easily: for if the primary power apt for knowing and understanding were not found in man, he would not have these individual aptitudes. That power is the one which is called "rationality," on account of which he becomes rational; it is the constitutive difference of the substantial nature of the species. That which is white or black or something of this sort is not among those things that arrive at the nature of the species or genus, and it separates and makes from it something that pertains to the being of man. You must, however, know most certainly the difference between the "more proper" difference and those other differences.

Other divisions of difference.

¶ Hence it can be said that some differences are separable, others inseparable. Of the inseparable ones, one is substantial, another accidental.

How "other" aliud and "altered" alteratum differ.

¶ Likewise, it can be said that one difference makes a thing "other" aliud, another makes it "altered" alteratum. A thing is "other" if its nature is different; "altered," however, is the composite and that other thing. For everything that differs from another is altered, but not everything that differs from another is "other," if we understand "other" as that which is different substantially. ¶ Likewise, one difference is that which makes an "altered" thing only, whether it be separable, like sitting and standing, or inseparable, such as being-able-to-laugh risibile and being-able-to-weep.

Being-able-to-laugh does not differ substantially from the not-laughable in terms of being-able-to-laugh, but in terms of being rational.

For although being-able-to-laugh must necessarily differ substantially from the not-laughable, this diversity does not reach the substance from the fact that it is "laughable"; the "laughable" happens secondarily after the diversity reaches the substance without it, and then happens to it. ¶ The first thing, however, that causes diversity is rationality alone. It is impossible that "being-able-to-laugh" makes that which is predicated of it differ substantially from that of which it is not predicated. Rather, the fact that they differ substantially is not from the "laughable," but from another thing which is rational. The difference, therefore, which is "more proper" is the essential cause of the difference making an "other" thing, according to the pleasure of the authors of this art who impose this name "other."

What the difference is, which is one of the five universals.

¶ Our intention here is to consider only this difference, which is one of the five, and no others; its certain description is this: it is a universal simple predicate of a species, in "what it is" according to the essence of its genus. ¶ And this is what is predicated of a species in "what it is." This also has many common descriptions, as when it is said that the difference is that by which a species differs from a genus, and also by which a species abounds from a genus, and also by which those things that agree in a genus differ, and which is predicated of many differing in species in "what it is."

Supplements the descriptions of the difference, which is the third predicable.

¶ We must, however, diligently consider these descriptions and certify them. We shall say, therefore, that when they add something to each of these descriptions, it will be equal; this, however, is to say "substantial," and this "substantial" is that by which the species differs substantially from the genus. For a property (although the species differs through it) is not of such a substantial nature.

A difference in which the genus of the definitum is not placed, although it signifies the essence of the definitum; and thus it is equal to it, yet it is complete.

¶ Similarly, it is said: it is said of that by which the species differs from the genus in its essence; and of this, that they are called substantial, those things which do not differ in genus; and of this, that it is predicated essentially of many in "what it is." ¶ The three descriptions, although they are equal to the difference, do not include that which is in the difference, such as the genus of which it is, by which the definition is completed, without which one could have the substantial signification equal to it. As if someone were to say that man is a "rational mortal," he would signify the nature of man, and it would be equal to him; but it would not be complete unless one named that which is to him as if it were a genus, which is "animal." But why or how this is, will be said later in its own place.

Other is as if it were the genus of the difference.

¶ That which is "as if it were the genus" of the difference, this is a universal: that which is added to it.

Others do not place in the descriptions the predicate "in what," as if the description of the universal is in place of the universal.

¶ In the description, however, the universal is already named when it is said that it is "predicated of many." For "to be predicated of many" is the description of a universal, which is already attributed to the description, another which is "as if it were the genus," although it does not designate it by name.

How we understand that the difference is predicated of many differing in species.

¶ This, however, which is said "of many differing in species," has three meanings: one which is not grasped by one who wishes to read through this book, which we shall show later in its own place.

The first meaning.

¶ The other two, however, are almost manifest. ¶ One is that the nature of the difference should hold for the predication of many species, undoubtedly besides that one species from which it differs.

The second.

¶ The other is that the nature of the difference is to be predicated in "what it is" of each of many differing in species among themselves:

The third.

as if it were said from it itself, it is predicated in "what it is," not to all together, but to each of them by itself. Just as if it were said that the "genus" is what humans retain, not that all humans share in it, but whoever it may be.

The refutation of the other meanings.

¶ This exposition, however, is alien and not correct. ¶ If, however, it could be understood from it except for what the first meaning is, then this description, understood in this way, will be vicious. For the difference, from the fact that it is a difference, should not (as you know) be proper to one species; this, in fact, happens; sometimes this happens to the universal; this happens to the accidents of the nature of the difference, but not to the stated difference itself. And because of this, it is not an accident common to all differences, so that this should be in the descriptions just as the difference is in the definitions: this is what is vicious. ¶ There is, however, a question in this, that it is said to be predicated in "what it is." We shall defer this until the place where we speak of these five differences. ¶ Although, if we understood the description according to our principles, and this which we explained otherwise, the description would be completed, and it will be a description of many. ¶ We, however, do not scrutinize this description in this place except according to that which those who treat of it understand. ¶ It should also be known that no difference constitutes species regarding the genus except one only.

Differences have two operations.

¶ Next, differences have two operations: one toward that which they divide, namely, the genus; and another toward that into which they divide. ¶ Rational, in fact, divides animal into man and constitutes man; it is the divisive of the genus and the constitutive of the species.

The difference of the most general genus does not have more than one operation.

If, however, the genus were the most general, it will not have differences except divisive ones; if, however, it were below the most general, it will have divisive and constitutive differences. And divisive and constitutive differences are those which divide its genus and constitute the species under it.

From which it appears that, speaking absolutely about the difference, it cannot be said that it is more common or less than that of which it is the difference.

¶ Constitutive differences of a genus are not under the genus. Divisive ones, however, are those which divide that and constitute the species under it. ¶ The constitutive ones of the genus are not less common than it; but its divisive ones are less common than it.

This most general genus does not have both differences, that is, the divisive and the constitutive.

¶ This most general genus has divisive differences, but not constitutive ones; the most specific species, however, has constitutive ones, but not divisive ones. ¶ No constitutive [difference] is except the divisive. Of the divisive ones, however (as it seems), some are not constitutive. This, however, is not except in negative or privative differences, which are not truly differences.

How every constitutive difference is divisive, but not conversely.

For when we say that an animal is either rational or irrational, the "irrational" did not stabilize any species opposite to the rational, unless perhaps it happened that whatever is irrational would be one species: just as that which is not divided into equal [parts] under a number is one species, and is "odd"; or if a man were not ashamed to posit an irrational animal as the genus of brutes and a species of animal. ¶ But this...