First Part

Privation is not understood except through its habit that is, the presence of the quality being lacked.

Even if someone were to do this, we would still show that "irrational" is not truly a difference, but is a certain commonality. It is similar with all privative terms: for privative terms are concomitants of things by comparison to the intentions they lack. For "irrational" is not understood except with respect to "rational." Therefore, "species" has its own intention through its difference, which is something existing in its essence; and then it follows that it is not predicated of another.

We are sometimes forced to impose privative names on things.

Sometimes, however, we are forced to apply a privative name for the intention that a thing has in its essence when it does not have its own name. However, it does not follow that this negation is its proper name; rather, it is a name communicating that thing, which is transferred from that to which it was assigned to another.

Consider conditional differences.

If, from among animals, there were nothing besides man and "neighing" referring to the horse, then "neighing" would be its difference. Furthermore, if this name existed and it were said to be "irrational," and "neighing" were understood from it, then "irrational" would give the designation of the difference.

He concludes that "irrational" is not a constitutive difference of the brute.

But since "irrational" is a certain thing common to the difference of each of the animal species, and it does not have some one common thing establishing an affirmative for which "irrational" could be placed—in which its sign would agree—except from the intention of privating "rational."

Privations as such are not constitutive of things.

Privations, by the fact that they are privations, are not intentions constitutive of things; rather, they are accidental and concomitant respectively. Since their essences are already established, then "irrational" is not truly a difference in which brutes agree, and which is constitutive of them.

True differences are those that are constitutive of what they divide. The work of certain people.

If, however, someone wishes to posit that as a difference and establish that "rational animal" is first a species and afterwards a genus, and to posit that "animal" is divided by one equal division into a most specific species and into a genus, he will act simultaneously; and then every divisive difference will also be a constitutive one. But if he wishes for the mode that is truly held, these would not be differences; for how would they be differences if they do not constitute any of the species? For true differences are only those that are constitutive of those which they divide. Regarding this, what some think is that there are certain differences which confer being and which divide, and then they wait until another difference comes and constitutes them simultaneously: just as "rational," which perhaps is thought to divide "animal," but it waits to constitute the species until "mortal" is joined to it.

Refutation of that view.

This opinion is false. For a difference that does not divide and from which the constitution of the species proceeds is not necessary at all to be that which constitutes the most specific species. It makes a difference whether we say that it constitutes "a" species, or that we say it constitutes the "most specific" species. For "rational," although it constitutes man, who is the most specific species, nevertheless constitutes "rational animal," which is the species of animal and the genus of man. If what he says were true, that "rational" is as common as "man," and that "rational animal" is predicated of man and of an angel not only by the commonality of the name, but univocally. However, this which is said—"rational animal"—is the word whose conjunction has an intellectual intention that is less than "animal," and it is not a difference; rather, the difference is its part—that is, "rational"—which is necessarily its proper difference, and which is without doubt its species. Similarly, it is shown that it is the genus of man, as the author of the Isagoge Porphyry previously manifested. Therefore, "rational" has already constituted the species toward which it was the genus; when, therefore, it divides, it constitutes without doubt.

The author of the Isagoge.

However, it is clear regarding this that one difference is not predicated in the first mode of predication except of one species always, nor is it predicated in the "what kind of thing" that is, definition or essence of many species, except secondarily and mediately by something. We will say, however, now that the essence of each thing is one.

Regarding the essence of a thing, it does not receive "more" or "less."

It is necessary, therefore, that the essence of a thing neither increases nor decreases. For if the being of a thing and its essence were the same—which is true among the terms of the aforementioned division—but what is augmented is beyond what is diminished, then the augmentation is beyond the being of the thing. Similarly, if its being were that which is diminished; similarly, if it were mediocre being. However, the intention common to three, which is not one in number, is not the essence of the thing itself which is one in number; for it cannot be said that the augmented and the diminished agree in one intention that is the essence. Therefore, the essence of a thing does not receive "more" or "less." If, however, it is augmented, its essence is constituted, and from its augmentation, then its essence is "more." If, indeed, its essence is not constituted from augmentation but from diminution, then its essence is "less." If, indeed, it is constituted from neither of them, then it is not constituted from augmentation or diminution, but from a common intention. And there is a question there which we previously mentioned: For what kind of impossibility is there regarding these intentions to say that when the root is augmented, it has the being that is augmented; but when it is augmented, it distracts that which it previously had as being, in the destruction of which is the destruction of that which had previously constituted it, and in its destruction is the destruction of that which was previously constituted? Similarly also regarding diminution; for the root is not the same thing in the first disposition and in the second disposition—that is, diminution; then it is manifest that that which is "more" properly does not regard "more" and "less."

He says that no philosopher holds that other inseparable differences can receive "more" or "less" in the same subject, such as limit, although with respect to different things it may receive "more" or "less." a He removes the doubt. b Whether "rational" and "properly rational" do not have "more" and "less." c If the rational difference does not receive "more" and "less," its operations receive "more" and "less." d Actions vary this diversity of the patients.

However, regarding other differences that arrive after the essence, nothing forbids them from receiving "more" or "less," whether they are separable—such as redness and blushing, and paleness from fear—or whether they are inseparable, such as the blackness of an Ethiopian. ^a And although one person may be more subtle and another more dull, nevertheless the rational virtue ^b does not receive "more" or "less," even if there were some being that understood absolutely nothing, like an infant. For this accident would not be its difference; for its difference is that in its substance there is a virtue which, when nothing prevents it, will perform rational operations; nevertheless, this virtue is one. ^c But sometimes a defect of instruments occurs, such as their hardness and disobedience; nevertheless, its actions are varied sometimes in slowness and destruction, and sometimes in "more" and "less." Its aforementioned intention, however, is remaining and stable, which is one in its nature; its actions are varied ^d according to the diversity of the patients receiving from it these modes of diversity, which sometimes were weaker, sometimes stronger; and this happens through that from which and in which it operates. Similarly, the heart and the brain are the centers of the rational virtue by which its power is perfected, so that the action of understanding and thinking and this, from the equality and inequality of its complexion, results in a diversity of these operations; for the rational is intellectual, and whatever is this is not a constitutive difference of man, but they are accidents and properties. And perfection is not except in the aptitude that occurs between two aptitudes: that is, the aptitude of the agent and the aptitude of the patient; but this which the agent now has does not vary.

Consider f: that to live through the rational is a difference, but "rationality" is not; for "rationality" makes one differ more than "rational," therefore this which is said seems doubtful.

You ought to know, however, that a difference which is one of the five is like "rational," which is predicated of the species absolutely; "rationality," however, is predicated of the species denominatively. These five are of one certain thing—that is, the name of the difference, whose form of name in all of them is that it should be predicated of all its singulars that agree in it, so that its name and its definition are attributed to it. "Rationality" does not give its name or its definition to anyone; this, however, if it is called a difference, let it be a difference, but of a different intention from that intention of which we are speaking. Similarly, understand "perpetuity" and "accident"; for these five ought to be predicated in the manner of the predication of genus and species according to that which is predication, although it may not be so regarding similarity in accidentality.

Rationality is a difference, but not according to how the difference is considered here. That is to say, there is a difference that makes things differ, and another concerning the predicate, from which the reason touched upon above is solved. As if to say, that it gives a predicate of many, just as genus and species, but not that they accidentally agree in predicate with genus and species.

A large ornamental initial P, featuring intricate floral and foliate patterns, is contained within a square decorative frame.
Property, however, according to the logicians, is said in two ways: in one way, that it is said of every intention that is proper to someone, whether absolutely or by comparison to someone else; in another way, that it is said of something that is proper to some species in itself and not to another. Sometimes also "property" is said of that which is of the species entirely and always. But the "property" that is one of the five according to the logicians—such as, for instance, that which is the middle of them—is that which is predicated of the individuals of one species in the "what kind of thing" that is, in what manner not substantially, whether it be common always or not. For that which is common always (whether it be the most specific species...

What a "property" is that is one of the five predicables according to the logicians.