Collected Works

Regarding a certain opinion: what is the fourth predicable and what it might be.

...[a] end: or middle) is more proper than B. Referring to the previous classification of predicables. But if this were a property that was one of the five, then the division would be greater than into five. However, although this is appropriated specially, nevertheless, beyond this, the name "proper" is common; and the other intention is more proper than that one. It is possible, however, that every accident which is proper to anyone at all might be called "proper," whether that "anyone" be a most general genus, or a subaltern genus, or a most specific species. The usage, however, has been to accept as "property" that which is proper to a species and a preceding difference. And the "property" that is one of the five is that which is predicated of the individuals of a certain species only, and not of others; whether it be common to all of them, or not common to all, or whether it be the middle, or the most specific. Some, however, wished to place all things other than the property among the common accidents, such that if it is not of one species only, but not to all, or to some part of it—and thus it is possible that that part does not have it—then it is a common accident, such that an accident is of one species and is all and always; and this is a property, or it is not so, but it is of many species or of one, but not in the way we said, and it is a common accident.

Refutation of the opinion.

But this statement is vicious, not signifying the thing or its commonality and its property and its unity, but according to something else. For the name of a "common accident" is posited to be opposed to the "proper." But since it does not happen that one can call it "proper" except according to this, that it is of one species, therefore the "common" cannot be called anything except what is of one species. Therefore, when we say this name "proper," it does not happen as we posited, that what is more proper of the three modes signifies the intention which is one of the five.

This acceptance of common things causes properties to be divided into four: namely, into a property which belongs to some species, but not to it alone, like "bipedal" in comparison to a horse; and into that which is more worthy, namely, that which belongs to every species; and into that which belongs to the species alone, but either to each or not to all, like navigation or agriculture for man; and into that which belongs to all and to the species, like "laughable" or "bipedal," although for the soul it is always, like youth for man.

The property, however, which is more worthy of being one of the five is the one we mentioned: that which is more suitable to be a property is that which is always communicating and belonging to the species, and to all, and always. But this which we say, that it is so and so, and always is a true property which is appropriated to the species and is not one of the division of five; for it contradicts that which we say, namely, that which is of the division of five, because truly the property is according to this, not that it itself is a true property that happens to be the "proper" of the species.

Laughability is not the proper: but the "laughable," and understand this thus: that it is not a proper in as much as it is a predicable.

You ought, however, to know that the property which is one of the five is "laughable," not "laughability"; and "navigable," not "navigability," and others like this, just as we said regarding the difference. Sometimes, however, we concede in words and accept "laughability" in place of "laughable."

Concerning the accident that is something else, so that it is not that which is divided against substance.

A common accident, however, is that which is predicable of many differing in species, not subalternately, like "white," not like "whiteness." This accident, however, is not that which is opposite to substance, as many think. For it is not predicated of its subject such that it is the subject itself, but is denominated from it by name. But these five are predicated in one way, as we have often said.

You hint expressly that the concrete accidental signifies both, namely, the form and the subject.

The common accident which is here is like "white" and like "one," and others. For it is said: "Socrates is white," meaning: Socrates is something, and there is whiteness. But the thing having whiteness is that which is predicated of Socrates by true predication. But the thing having whiteness is not an accident in the way in which it is opposite to substance, but is a present accident according to this intention. Because of this, also, when we say that a body is either created or is eternal, "eternal" or "created" is neither genus, nor difference, nor property, nor species of body, but is of the collection of predicables in this way. "Created," however, is not an accident according to this intention. For if it were so, then the accident would be predicated of the body not by denomination, and

How accident is taken here.

thus the body would be an accident. An accident, however, is understood here as "the accidental," even if it is not an accident according to the true intention. The "accidental," however, is one thing, and the "proper" is another; the "accidental" is opposite to the subaltern and the essential, while the accident is opposite to substance. The essential is sometimes an accident, like a genus of an accident, as color is to whiteness; sometimes it is a substance. The accidental similarly is sometimes an accident, sometimes it is a substance. Here, however, "accident" is understood only as "the accidental," because we have not yet shown the disposition of the accident which is opposite to substance.

He secretly criticizes Porphyry.

And this is what he who proposed the assignment of these five to logic did not first consider.

The vulgar descriptions of the common accident are taken from the chapter on accident by Porphyry.

Next, the common accident has divulged descriptions, such as this which says that an accident is that which is present and absent without the corruption of the subject; and such as that which is said, that an accident is that which can have the same and not have it; and that it is: neither genus, nor species, nor difference, nor proper, but always subsisting in a subject.

The first argument against the first description of the common accident.

Let us consider, therefore, these divulged descriptions. The first, however, is vicious in many ways. First, because the intention which is to it as if a genus is not named in it. And we have already found something similar to this in some definitions of difference.

The second.

Then, because if it is understood from "being present and absent" as "to be made and to be destroyed," then common accidents that are inseparable are not so. But these people concede that a common accident is one thing, and another is inseparable. If, however, it is understood from this, that it is to be in the opinion in both cases, then a name is already given which, according to them, is only common by voice. For this, which is said by this name "to be present," even from opinion, is called equivocal only according to participation of voice; but this is among those things which have already been prohibited, as will be manifested later.

The third.

After this, however, of the accidentals which are not essential, there are some upon whose removal in opinion it is impossible for the thing to remain as it is, not corrupted, as we have already shown in the aforementioned; and there are some after which it is not impossible in opinion for it to remain, not corrupted. But concerning all these, there is no mention in this description, all of which are found in the second description. For many of the accidents are always remaining, but that which is always remaining cannot "not be" except in opinion only; but he did not name "opinion." If, however, he had named it, what we said would follow.

That which remains cannot "not be" except through the intellect.

In the description by negation, however, the third, the singulars of the accidents agree.

Refutation of the third statement of the accident.

If, however, they add to it that which is "beyond," this will be appropriated to the common accident. But the author of this art added to it "that which is subsisting in a subject"; this, however, he did not add, except because he thought from this that the accident which is here, one of the five, is an accident which is opposite to substance. But it is already said that the utility of this addition is nothing, except that it might be distinguished between that and a name which signifies nothing; thus it is a doubt. But it is fabulous. For he, from this which he said, that "it is not a genus," did not understand anything except a name which signifies an intention beyond which is neither an intention of genus, nor species, nor difference, nor property, which in this does not agree with that which is not signifying. For he does not define the accident as it is heard, so that when it is said: "it is not a genus, nor species, nor difference, nor property," it agrees with it in this other name which signifies nothing, from which it is necessary that a difference be added which is between this and that. If, however, this statement signifies nothing except as it is heard, other names heard which are signifying agree in it, and they are neither genus, nor species, nor difference, nor property.

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The first part of the book of the collection of the proper is completed; and to God, to whom nothing is similar, may there be infinite thanks.

A decorative initial letter 'C' features floral or scrollwork patterns inside the letter form.

Knowledge of what has been said concerning the division of these five is sufficient for now to treat of the commonalities and differences that are between these five.

The use of the books of introductions was to treat of commonality and discrimination.

The usage, however, in books of introductions has been to treat of these. We will do thus as those who considered it have said; and