Collected Works

We shall begin with the commonalities, stating that the commonality in which these five referring to the five predicables agree is this: that none of them are substantiae substances predicated of many things, but all agree in another respect, namely, that whatever is predicated of their predicate as of a subject, that same thing is predicated of their subject. For the nature of the most general genus is predicated of everything of which the subalternate genus is predicated; similarly, the genus of the difference and the difference of the difference; likewise, that which is predicated of the property and the accident. For "colored," which is the genus of "white," is predicated of "white Socrates." Similarly, "visible," which is an accident of "white," is predicated of "white Socrates," because it is predicated of its common accident; for it is said that every white thing is visible. Similarly, "mutation," which is the genus of "laughable" referring to the capacity to laugh as a property of man; for all these things are predicated univocce univocally; for of whatever they are predicated, they attribute their own name and definition.

First commonality of genus and difference.

¶ Genus and difference agree in a common usage: for the nature of the genus is to be predicated of the species. But if it is not necessary, it is still not impossible. Similarly, it is not impossible for the nature of the difference to be predicated of several species, but there is something contrary to this which we have already addressed in the aforementioned referring to earlier sections of the work.

Refutation of Porphyry's example.

¶ They set forth the example of "rational" as containing many species, and you know what the issue is here, because as you know, they did not do well in positing this example of "rational." For although it contains many species, those species are not immediate to it, but are species of one species which "rational" constitutes when it is added to "animal."

¶ If, however, they do not wish to say this of the immediate species, but of any species whatsoever, then they must not forget this when they assign the commonality between genus and species; for some species contain many species. They, however, do not properly posit this commonality between genus and species.

2nd commonality of genus and difference.

¶ The second commonality commonly cited is this: that genus and difference agree in this, that whatever is predicated of these is also predicated of those species that are contained under them. You know, however, that this commonality is not proper to genus and difference, but is common to others as well. If, however, one says that that which is predicated of them is also predicated of these species contained under them, this shows clearly what has been said; yet if it were to be said, it would be true if it is understood to be predicated "in what" in quid answering the question "what is it", which is predicated in response to an inquiry of "what," as we will show in the first part.

3rd commonality of their commonness.

¶ The third commonality commonly cited is this: the destruction of those things which are contained referring to the species under a genus implies the destruction of the species at the same time. For when animality and rationality are destroyed, man and horse are destroyed, etc. This commonality, however, follows from another commonality which is the root; that is, that each of them is a part of the species and contains them. Therefore, this is the root and that is the branch, and this is the proper commonality between genus and difference, which is not found in others.

First property of genus and difference.

¶ Of the properties by which they differ from others, the first commonly cited is this: that the genus is predicated of more things than the difference, the species, the property, and the accident. But that this which is predicated of more things is species, difference, and property is evident, for the property is proper to one species only; similarly for the difference.

Objection which he does not solve.

¶ Regarding the accident, however, it is not so clear by itself whether it ought to be less than the genus. For the properties of the ten predicaments, of which we shall speak later, are accidents common to their species, and they are not in the inferior genera in their commonality.

It could be said that the genus is predicated of more things than the accident, since there is no genus that cannot be predicated of less than two species. But there is some accident that does not have a predicate other than one single species, as is said concerning some compounded accidents.

There is, however, some commonality among them, and greater ones, such as this, that substance is such that it does not receive "more" and "less"; for this is a commonality of substance.

¶ If, however, anyone says that this negation contains no intention, we can find commonalities and accidents which are common to each of the predicaments, such as "one" and "being," and such as "to begin" or "to become."

2nd property of the same.

¶ The second difference which is assigned between genus and difference is this: that the genus contains the difference in potentiality. For when you consider the nature of the substance of generality, it is not necessary for the differences to exist, nor is it impossible, but its existence is possible, the possibility of which is a possibility that is not equal to the nature of the genus, but in the nature of the genus remains its opposite, and the possibility of another difference; and this is the intention of "pertaining," and the pertaining of the difference is to equal the whole thing and to transcend the part.

sibility which is not equal to the nature of the genus; rather, in the nature of the genus, its opposite remains, as does the possibility of another difference. And this is the intention of "pertaining," and the pertaining of the difference is to equal the whole thing and to transcend the part.

3rd property of genus and difference.

¶ The third difference is that the genus is prior to the difference; for in the genus, sometimes a designated difference is found, but sometimes the difference has no existence except in the genus, and because of this, when it is destroyed, the nature of the genus is not destroyed.

Doubt.

¶ In these two differences, there is a certain doubt, for some of the differences are outside the nature of the genus, such as division into equals and unequals, just as it is thought to be outside of number.

¶ The response to this will be made manifest later.

4th property of genus and difference.

¶ The fourth difference is that the difference is predicated in "what kind of thing" Latin: "in quale quid" - a specific type or quality, whereas the genus is predicated in "what" Latin: "in quid" - the essence or definition.

First argument against the property.

¶ But this statement alone does not establish a difference; for to attribute two different properties to two things does not signify the difference that is between them. For if someone were to say that the difference between Plato and Socrates is that this one is sensible, while that one is rational, and this one is a sailor, while that one is an artisan, this does not suffice to differentiate them. For two properties that are different in the intellect perhaps can happen to the same person, and it is not far-fetched that Plato is sensible. Therefore, although this intellect is different from the fact that Socrates is rational, it does not therefore follow that Plato differs from him; for it is not impossible that each of them, along with being sensible, is also rational. For properties that are possible in the intellect sometimes coincide in some well-defined property, such as "sailor" and "artisan," but there ought to be a force of negation between them, such that being sensible excludes being rational, and being rational excludes being sensible.

Second argument.

¶ Furthermore, that the genus is predicated in "what" does not prevent it from being predicated in "what kind of thing" according to the principles of these things; nor according to them is there a force of negation here. For by that which constitutes the being of a thing, it is not impossible for a thing to differ from that which does not have that being, such that it is predicated in "what" according to that in which it agrees, and according to this and by that which distinguishes it, it is predicated in "what kind of thing." Thus, it is not impossible for the genus of something to be the difference of another, according to different respects. If the difference that is sought is this, the impossible does not follow from the fact that the genus of something is its difference, or that the difference of something is the genus of another; this is not impossible according to how I understand it, just as "sensible" is a genus in one way for the hearing and the sight, and is a difference in another way.

¶ If someone says that one thing is sometimes the genus and the difference of something, though it is the genus and difference of something, nevertheless the respects in which it is a genus are the respects in which it is a difference, and says that we do not wish anything other than to show the difference which is between the two respects, of which one is called "generality" and the other "differentiality," we will not argue with him, nor will we attend with him to the terminology; for the thing here is different from that with which our discourse is concerned. Our discourse with him is that which says that the name of genus and difference signifies two different natures, so that nothing is appropriated to two natures according to one mode; rather, he posits one of the two natures as competent for one of the two predications, and the other for the other predication.

Objection.

¶ The mode of "what": just as there is an interest between this which is said "what" and the definition, it is not stable in that way.

Solution.

¶ Someone could say to us, "You have already often clearly divided that the difference is sometimes predicated in 'what,' and especially in the book of demonstration."

It is one thing to be predicated in "what" and another to be predicated as if in "what."

¶ To which we say, because there is an interest between this which we say, that something is predicated in "what," and something is predicated as if in "what," just as there is an interest between this which we say "to be" and this which we say "to be contained in being."

¶ A predicable that is "as if in what" is all that which is contained in the intention made about being, and that alone does not signify being.

¶ A predicable "in what" is that alone which responds to "what." The difference, however, pertains to being and "as if in what," because it is a part of that which is responded to "what," but in some cases and not in others; the genus, however, always signifies "what it is," for it always shows the principle.