Collected Works

the beginning of the essence of the thing. ¶ However, differences are perhaps comparisons and rationales concerning actions and passions and other things: on account of this, one places the genus that is more fitting to these in answering the question "what is it?" ¶ In these words, there is a double error: one, that the differences which are bonum good are not constitutive, but rather attendant. The other, that when one thing differs from another, it is necessary that it possesses that difference and not another. If, however, the difference is placed by a single word, in a greater and better part of the word, for example, if one were to say that the genus is more fitting to answer "what is it?" than the difference, then the diversity will not be according to essence but according to the aptitude which is in one of these and not in the other. If, however, they do this, there will be a deviation from the certainty of demonstration to some other accidental thing. If, however, one does not do this, there will be a dissonance between the genus and some of its differences. ¶ The difference which comes after this is this: that of the genera, the species have but one.

Fifth property of genus and difference

Objection.

Solution.

¶ In this statement, there is an absolute error: for if one takes the genus in any way—not just the proximate and continuous one—many genera are also found for one species, for diverse genera are sometimes many for one thing by commonality. ¶ But not all are true genera of that thing, because some of them are the genera of their own genus. Similarly, many different differences are found in order, but they are not truly the differences of any one thing, for some of them are the differences of their own genus. ¶ As for the example they posited: "rational" is not the proximate difference of man, according to how they ordered their division, but is the difference of its own genus; and according to this opinion, there is no proximate difference for it except "mortal." ¶ This, however, according to their example, is one thing. Just as the proximate genus which is not the most general (according to their example) is one, so also the proximate difference (which is not the difference of the genus) according to their example is one, which is "mortal." But in these places, other examples can be found, such as "sensible" and "mortal." By will, however, there appear to be two proximate differences: therefore, the proximate genus of an animal is only one, and proximate differences are sometimes more than one. ¶ Likewise, there is another error here: namely, that there are many genera, of which some are contained in others, until the last one has one genus; but many differences are separated and are not contained in others, but it is sufficient to speak to this in another doctrine.

Sixth property of genus and difference

Regarding the genus not being matter as such. See Averroes, Physics, ch. 17.

¶ The difference which follows this is: that the genus is like matter, but the difference is like form. ¶ The fuller sense of this is to say that it is the same as matter and not-matter: for matter is not predicated of the composite such that the composite is the matter itself, but the genus is predicated of the species, such that the species is the genus itself. Matter, also, when two diverse forms are posited, is not compared to both except in two times; the genus, however, contains both opposite differences in the same time. ¶ There are, however, other differences here, which are deferred to be said elsewhere: that the genus is not matter, nor is the difference form, but it is like matter, in that its nature in the intellect is receiving the difference; when the difference arrives at it, it becomes some thing existing in act, such as the disposition of matter and form. ¶ Since the genus is to the difference as matter is to form, and the difference is to the genus as form is to matter, it is clear.

First commonality of genus and difference

Second commonality.

First difference of genus and species.

A large ornamental drop cap 'P' at the bottom of the first column. The bowl of the letter contains a detailed illustration of a human head or figure surrounded by intricate foliage and scrollwork. The body of the letter is thick and decorated with geometric patterns.

The first thing commonly said between genus and species is the commonality which it had with the difference, because both are prior to those things of which they are predicated; that is, to those of which they are the genus and species. ¶ The second is a general commonality: namely, that each of them is a universal; and those who assign this commonality indicate that this commonality is general, which it repeats again. If, however, one wishes to take "universal" otherwise here, then it must be understood beyond the absolute universal, namely, that which is common to the being of its singulars. ¶ The first difference of which is that which it...

Second difference.

had with the difference: namely, that the species is contained under the genus, but the genus is not contained under the species. ¶ Likewise, another difference in which the sense is the same: namely, that the nature of the genus is prior to the nature of the species, and this is because if the nature of the genus is posited, the nature of the species is not necessarily posited, but if it is destroyed, the nature of the species is destroyed; however, if the nature of the species is destroyed, the nature of the genus is not destroyed; rather, if it is posited, it is posited.

Third difference.

¶ Likewise, another difference related to these is: that the genus is predicated of the species univocally and universally; the species, however, is not predicated of the nature of the genus universally. ¶ But this difference is included in the difference of being contained and not being contained, and it is not one of the differences which are fundamentally in the power of negating and affirming; for this would be if one said that the genus is predicated of the species univocally and universally, and then that the property is removed from the species. But it is not denied of the species according to this mode, but otherwise: namely, that it is not predicated of the genus univocally and universally; however, this negative is not that affirmative. The form of this difference, however, is this: that the species is not a part of the genus in the respect that the genus has toward the species.

Fourth difference.

Understand this regarding actual containment, and not potential.

¶ Likewise, another difference is that each of the genus and species exceeds the other in the way that the other does not exceed the other; for the genus exceeds the species in universality; it contains many other subjects beyond the subjects of the species. The species, however, exceeds the genus in intention: for it contains in itself the intention of the genus and, additionally, the intention of the difference. Just as an animal contains under its universality a man and that which is not a man, such as that which is beyond humanity. Similarly, man contains in his intention animality and another intention beyond animality: namely, rationality.

Fifth difference.

¶ Likewise, another difference, as if arisen from that one, is that between species there is no most general genus, nor is there a most special species among genera; since in each, there is a middle.

First priority of genus and species.

Second priority of genus and property.

¶ The genus and the property are prior in this: that they are predicated of the species and follow it, because if the species is posited, the property is posited. But the agreement is sometimes with something else besides the property, for it happens in the B with the common property. ¶ Likewise, another commonality is that the nature of the genus is predicated of the species contained under it equally; for the species of animal are equally animals, nor do they receive "more" and "less." Similarly, also, the property, such as "laughable," is predicated of the individuals of men.

He secretly impugns Porphyry. Firstly. Secondly. Thirdly.

He declares that the property is such that properties do not receive "more" or "less," and not in all [cases].

¶ This commonality, if it were designated in the commonality which is between the genus and the species and the difference, would be better; but it is omitted there and placed here. ¶ Although it does not occur in every property. For modesty, in effect, is proper to man, which is not equal in them. Similarly, many other things in others. ¶ What reason this man proposed here, or what induction to demonstrate that the property is thus considered: he has not posited but one example of this; which mode of demonstration is not doctrinal in declaring that which is not known in itself. ¶ This, however, is certainly true in some properties, not in all that are properties of aptitude and natural forms, and which are always species. But essential properties which follow matter receive "more" and "less."

Third priority of genus and property.

¶ But he who said here that he forgot this, in the following things he posits the contrary to it; when he assigns a property of such a mode to which the difference does not occur, as you will know later. ¶ Likewise, there is another commonality: namely, that each of them is predicated of its inferiors univocally in name and definition, and it could also be said of others besides themselves. Whoever hears this and understands and grasps it, must not forget what is said in the book of the Categories: when it is thought that that which is predicated univocally is only substantial.

First difference of genus and property.

The property in the fourth mode in three ways. Second difference of genus and property.

¶ The first difference is that the genus is prior essentially; the property, however, is posterior: for the property does not exist unless the species exists; and it occurs either from matter: such as the breadth of the nails or other things of this kind; or from form: such as "perceptible to doctrine"; or from both: such as "laughable." ¶ The second difference is that the genus contains many species; the property, however...