Collected Works

Correcting the doubt of Porphyry Neoplatonic philosopher and logician.

they agree in it. ¶ The name of "containing" is an ambiguous name, not a doctrinal one: nor is it necessary to treat it. ¶ But the way in which "containing" is understood, which is attributed to accidens accidental attribute and genus generic category, is different from the way that denies it from them. ¶ There was, however, another way that would have been better to state: namely, that an accidens is sometimes contained and sometimes contains: for that which is underneath in a certain respect is more containing, and in a certain respect less common, just as "white" is predicated of something other than man, and thus "man" is predicated of something other than "white." Hence, neither is every man white, nor is every white thing a man: but some man is that, and some of that is not this. ¶ Nor, however, is the discrepancy from all accidentia accidental attributes, but not from all. It must be noted how he placed the accidens of a thing for which it is not common outside the universality of the accident: which in the aforementioned seemed to be in it and from it. He placed it thus because to an accidens—from which he distinguishes a differentia difference—he attributes the necessity of coming to a species and something more: perhaps, however, he did not want this discrepancy to be from every accidens but from some. ¶ Likewise, there is another: that no differentia receives "more and less." ¶ For they do not prohibit receiving "more and less"; because it is an accidens, it is not prohibited from having this. Here, however, he said absolutely that accidentia receive "more and less," and differentiae do not. ¶ Likewise, there is another discrepancy: that differentia-nature prohibits opposite differentiae from being had in one subject, such that the same thing is rational and irrational. Accidentia-nature, however, does not prohibit this: for example, separable accidentia sometimes have one subject. ¶ A species agrees with a proprium property in this: that they are predicated reversibly, and in this, that each has its existence similarly. ¶ They differ, however, in this: that that which is a species is sometimes the genus of another: but a proprium is not made a proprium of another. ¶ Nor is the differentia less dissolved, for in what was premised he did not consider the differentia that is between a species that is under a genus, and something else: but he always intends the species that is the "most specific" species. Now, however, he passes over that and intends the species that is under a genus, as was clear until now. ¶ But if he were to say that the species of something sometimes becomes the proprium of another, while a proprium does not become a species: it would be a coming differentia, but the judgment concerning the species would be false. ¶ If, however, he were to say that the species of something becomes the genus of another, but a proprium of nothing becomes a genus: he would say this fittingly, but the judgment concerning the proprium would be false. But just as a species that is not "most specific" becomes a genus, similarly, the proprietas property of a species that is not "most specific" becomes a genus. It is, after all, a proprietas of a higher species, and is a genus of its own species: such as color, which is both a proprietas and a genus. ¶ If, however, he were to say that a species of something sometimes becomes a proprietas of another, while a proprietas of something does not become a proprietas of another, it would be fitting. ¶ Another differentia is that a species is prior in being, while a proprium is posterior: and this is intelligible and to be conceded. ¶ Then he added another differentia: namely, that a species is a species in act, while a proprium is sometimes in potency. ¶ But here is a dispute. For if he wishes to speak of a proprium as being in effect, then he will deviate from the path he has been following until now; if, however, he calls proprietas a natural aptitude, this species is in act. ¶ Similarly, this differentia (if it is true) ought also to be placed between genus and differentia along with proprium. ¶ Likewise, another differentia is that their definitions are different. ¶ But this differentia is common to all, and is not peculiar only between species and proprium. ¶ A species and an accidens agree in this: that they are universals. And he said there are not many things in which they agree, because they are too distant. ¶ The differentia is that the one is in being, while the other is not. ¶ And that for each individual, the species is one: while an accidens is not one. ¶ But by this differentia, it is found between genus and accidens, and between species and proprium. ¶ And that a species is prior to an accidens in intelligible being. ¶ And that under a species, its participants participate equally: but an accidens does not, if it is separable: like the blackness of an Ethiopian. ¶ A proprium and an inseparable accidens agree in this: that they are prohibited from their subjects. ¶ But the differentia should not have been passed over between species and an inseparable accidens. ¶ They differ, however, in this: that a proprietas is of one species only; an inseparable accidens is of any—

2nd differentia of accidens and differentiae.
Against Porphyry.
3rd differentia.
Agreement of species and proprium.
First differentia of species and proprium.
He criticizes Porphyry.
2nd differentia of species and proprium.
3rd differentia.
Against Porphyry.
4th differentia.
Agreement of species and accidens.
Differentiae of species and accidens.
First.
Second.
Third.
Fourth.
Agreement of proprium and inseparable accidens.
Differentia of proprium and inseparable accidens.

of one species: like the blackness of an Ethiopian and a raven. He ought, however, to remember here what he said in the previous part. ¶ Likewise, another differentia is that an inseparable accidens does not participate equally; a proprium, however, does so equally. You, however, read what the cause is in this. ¶ These are the commonalities and differentiae made public, which he who made the first book on the five universals set forth, with which we are content according to his order. ¶ Whatever he said concerning differentiae that are not common can be corrected: such that he says, for example, that a differentia is not accustomed to be so: and this will be a corruption of his reading, but this is not always so. ¶ For if he had proceeded correctly, he ought to have assigned the commonalities that exist between the five, and then those that are between the four and four. And then between the three and three. And then between the two and two. ¶ Similarly, he ought to have first assigned the differentiae of each one to the remaining four, and then of two to three. And then of each one to the other properly. And if he had gone diligently, as he should have, there would not be a commonality or differentia between any two there which he would pass over indefinitely and not assign them between other two: as if perhaps he assigns where he passed over; it would be more convenient.

2nd differentia.
In what way Porphyry should be corrected in the last book.

A large, ornate drop cap 'P' features a seated figure—possibly a scholar or saint—within the frame of the letter.

After we have already shown what universals we ought to know, since that which is a genus among them is not a genus of each thing, but only of its own species. Similarly, a differentia is not a differentia of each thing, but according to this, it is divisive of one genus, and according to this, it is constitutive of the differentia of that genus. ¶ You ought also to know that each of these—to be a genus or quasi-genus, and differentia, and species, and proprium, and accidens. ¶ For "sensible" is as a species of the one apprehending, and is a genus of the hearing and the seeing, and is a differentia of "animal." "Venerable" is a genus of the biped and the quadruped, and is a species of the mobile, and a proprietas of "animal," and is common to the name of men. ¶ Sometimes those five agree in one thing. ¶ A genus, however, is not a genus of a differentia in any way: nor is a differentia a species of a genus. If it were so, then the differentia would be another differentia: for a differentia is an intention outside the nature of the genus. ¶ For "rational" is not an "animal having reason," but a "something having reason," although the being of an animal accompanies it: for an "animal having reason" is a man. ¶ If, however, "animal" were within the intention of "rational," then when it were said "rational animal," it would be as if one said "animal that is animal": for "having reason" and "rational" are the same. ¶ When, however, a genus is predicated of a differentia, it is like when an inseparable accidens is predicated of that of which it is predicated, and it is not within its being: but the genus is the differentia as if it were matter, whose comparison to it is in a certain way. Thus, the proposition of a proprium that is not: every differentia constitutes and gives it existence in effect, although it begins within its definition and its existence. This is within that existence of the things: and thus matter and form: but this is if it were a differentia of the genus absolutely, and it were not outside its existence in any way. If, however, one diligently attends, each of them is predicated only of the species. Nor do you learn all things in passing through. ¶ But the proposition of a genus to a differentia is like the proposition of a common accidens. ¶ A common accidens is sometimes the proposition of a genus [which] is a proprietas, and sometimes the proposition of a species [is] a common accidens, such as "moving by will," which is a proprietas of "animal," and a common accidens of "man." ¶ Sometimes it is a proprietas of a higher genus: such as whiteness, which is of the proprietas of a composite body, and is a common accidens of "man," and sometimes it is of the proprietas of the most general genus. ¶ Sometimes a common accidens is not a proprietas of any genus: for it happens outside those categories. Such as "not receiving more and less," which is of the commonalities of substance, and is common to it and another: nor is it a proprietas of any genus: afterward, you will know that other most general [genera] have this. ¶ The comparison of "animal" to "this animal," according to that which it is an "animal," and adds to it a designation, not considered in it as "rationality," is thus the proposition of a genus to individuals: sometimes also it is predicated of it, as a species, which is the species of the individual things, of individuals: but not as a genus. For it is not a genus in the proposition of individual animals according to that which they are rational, as the proposition of this "rational" is not—

In what way the five universals sometimes arrive at one.
Genus does not become genus of differentia; nor does differentia become species of genus.
That genus does not become within the intention of a divisive differentia.
In what way genus is predicated of its divisive differentia.
What is the proposition of a divisive differentia to genus and vice versa.
That nothing is a proprium of a genus and a common accidens of a species.
To give some common accidens which is not a proprium of anyone.
In what way "animal" is made compared to "this animal" badly: as a genus, and as a species.