Collected Works

How genus is mixed with difference.

considered in the quality that is in it. For it is as a species according to the intentions we have mentioned. ¶ And it is the same as when a difference is a proper species. For the difference of individual animals is "laughable" original: "risibile", and it is as a species to this laughable, when not considered according to this, that it is man: for it is not proper except to man or to the individuals of man. ¶ Similarly, "white" to this white (for that of which it is white is designated) is as a species: an accidens accidental attribute which is common is not common except to the thing which is the subject: so that it is "white," not to this white, but which is this white. ¶ It must also be known that these sometimes are mixed among themselves in many ways: for a genus with a difference: for the apprehendens the apprehensive [faculty] is as the genus of the difference of man which is "rational," or "having a soul," which is the genus of "rational," and thus it is the genus of the difference. But it happens to it that it is the difference of the genus: for "having a soul" is the difference of the sensitive genus which man possesses. ¶ Sometimes, however, a genus is mixed with an accidens: such as "color," which is the genus of accidents, of those which are whiteness or blackness. ¶ But it does not constitute a difference from the first: for it is not said that the genus of a constitutive difference is the genus of a species, and it can be as a genus that is an accidens to it. ¶ I concede, however, that the genus of a difference is sometimes the constitutive difference of a genus or species, and thus the genus of an accidens is an accidens of the genus and species. ¶ The mixture of a genus with a property is thus: "admiring" in act, which is as the genus of "laughing" in act, which is a property; and "vociferating" is the genus of "neighing," which is a property. ¶ Differences also are sometimes mixed with a genus: just as "sensible," which is a difference and genus of man. ¶ And they are mixed with a property: just as the proposition regarding two right angles of that whose three angles are said to be equal to two right angles. For it is the difference and property of a triangle. ¶ Sometimes they are mixed with an accidens: such as "light-diffusing" of the sight, which is the difference of the accident to the sight. ¶ A property is sometimes mixed with a genus: for "going" is the common property of man. ¶ And sometimes it is mixed with a difference: and it does not often cease to be the property of the species, [but] sometimes it is with the property of the species: but this is when the difference is common: just as "divided into two equals," which is the difference of an even number: for having a middle is as the property of this difference. ¶ Sometimes, however, it is mixed with a common accidens: for "visible" is the property of colors. But "colored" is the common accidens of the body. ¶ An accidens is sometimes mixed with a genus, and it does not cease to be an accidens of the species. For it is an accidens of the species, but it is from the number of the accidents of the species: and it is not a common accidens of the genus, but is its property. There is, however, something which is a common accidens to both, and with this it is likewise the accidens of the difference and the property.
¶ The second part of the first book is completed, and to Him who gave the knowledge be infinite thanks.

How genus is mixed with an accidens.

Mixture of genus with property.

Mixture of difference with genus, property, and accidens.

Mixture of property with genus, difference, and accidens.

Mixture of accidens with others.

A large, ornamental drop cap 'S' contains a seated figure, likely a scholar, at a desk with a book.

It was useful that when I distinguished these five from the context of the five predicables, I should say that in one respect they are natural, and in another logical, and in another intellectual; and perhaps I would also say that in one respect they are without multiplicity, and in another with multiplicity; and it was the custom that the treatise on these should be placed continuously with the treatise on genus and species, even though this is common to the five. ¶ We will say, therefore, the unities of the things, that each of those which are placed as examples for any of these five is in itself something else: and in this which is a genus, or species, or difference, or property, or common accidens, there is something else. ¶ We shall place in this an example of a genus, saying: that "animal" is in itself something, and it is the same as when it is "sensible," or it is an intellect in the soul. But in itself: it is neither universal, nor is it singular. For if in itself it were universal, so that "animality" from this which is animality is universal, it would be necessary that no animal be singular, but every animal would be universal. If, however, "animal" from this which is "animal" were singular, it would be impossible for there to be more than one singular: but the singular itself to which animality belongs, and it would be impossible for any other singular to be an animal. ¶ "Animal," however, in itself is something understood in the mind as it is "animal," and according to this which is understood to be "animal," it is nothing but "animal" only. If, however, beyond this, it is understood to be universal, or singular, or something else, then something is understood beyond this: namely, that which is "animal" which happens to "animality." ¶ For "animality" does not become singular and designated unless something is joined to it which makes it so. Similarly, it is in the intellect, for it does not become singular unless the intellect adds something through which it becomes singular. ¶ Then it does not happen extrinsically that it is universal, so that it is one essence most truly which is "animal" to which it happens in universals extrinsically, so that the same thing has being in many, but in the mind it happens to this form of "animality" understood, that it is placed in relation to many, and that of the one form itself there is a certain relation to many which are simulated in it: for the intellect predicates it of each one of them. ¶ But how this is further, attend: for just as every figure or of others, or like a "white cloth," but "white cloth" in itself is something, and "whiteness" is another which is joined: thus something else is composed from each. ¶ Similarly, "animal" in the intellect is something, and its universality or generality is another something, and this which is "general animal" is another something. ¶ And generality is called a "logical genus": concerning which it is understood that it will be predicated of many beings of a species in answer to the question made by "what is it," and it does not express or designate something which is "animal" or another something. ¶ Just like "white," which in itself is something understood. But what "man" or "stone" might be is beyond that which is understood of it: but it is read to it, and it is thought to be one, and the logical genus is this. ¶ A "natural genus" is "animal" insofar as it is "animal": which is apt for this, so that to that which is understood of it, a relation of generality is placed. For when it is already understood in the soul, it becomes apt so that generality may be understood for it: to which that which is understood of Socrates is not apt, nor that which is understood of man. ¶ Therefore, the nature of "animality" which has being in sensible things arises through this accidens from the nature of "humanity" which is the nature of Socrates, for the reason that it is of this kind: and when it is understood, it becomes apt to be called universal, namely, the generality which is with it: and it has nothing outside except aptitude, whence it is said. ¶ Therefore, this which is called "genus" (which wishes for the natural thing to be understood which becomes apt in the intellect to be a genus, and in natural things it is not a genus, but because those things which are of other natural things are mixed into it) it is not far that the name of this intention should be appropriated to it: so that this name is denoted from that which happens to it in some way, which is generality. When, however, the general is in the intellect, this is that which is understood of the natural genus: namely, the composite. But generality understood by itself (according to this which is by itself alone in the intellect, and is an intellectual genus: for it is something in them through which the logician treats) is a "logical genus." ¶ This logical genus, however, although it does not have being except in the intellect, it is not, however, said that that which is understood from this which is "intellectual" is that which is understood from this as it is "logical": and it is not the same, since all is a diversity of either respect. ¶ Furthermore, within the logical genus there are two: one, namely, the species of it, as from this that it is a genus; another, the subject of its own, to which it happens. Its species, however, are those which the genus absolutely is, more universal, and the most general genus, and the subaltern genus. Therefore, it itself attributes to each of its determined genera which are beneath it, its definition and name: and each one of them is said to be a genus, and defines the definition of the genus: but to the species beneath them, it does not attribute its definition nor its name. For "man" (which is the species of the animal insofar as this is "animal") is not predicated of it with animality, the generality which happens to animality: neither by name nor by definition, insofar as animality is predicated of it. ¶ If, however, any species should be a genus, it does not have this through its own generality which is above it, but from the part of those which are beneath it. But the "natural genus" attributes to that which is beneath it its own name and definition from the part of its nature, namely, from this, e.g., that "animal" is "animal," not from this that it is a "natural genus." For something which, when it is with the intellect, will be desired to become a genus from this that is so: for it is impossible that this does not have that which is beneath it. ¶ And altogether, when it is said that "natural genus" gives to that which is beneath it its own name and definition: this is not sufficiently true, unless accidentally. For it does not give from this that it is a "natural genus," just as it also did not give to it this which is a "logical genus": which it did not give except the nature which is apt to be a "natural genus"; but this nature by itself is not a "natural genus," thus it is not a genus.

How animal becomes universal through the intellect.

What a logical genus is.

What a natural genus is.

Although a logical genus is predicated of its species by name and definition, it is not predicated of the species of its subjects in this way.

How that which the natural genus gives to that which is beneath it, the name and definition, is to be understood.

Animal in itself: it is neither singular nor universal.

Animal in itself is animal only.