Collected Works

Sometimes another kind is prior in the intellect: then in sensible things, and sometimes the reverse.

The same threefold existence of unity: namely, before the thing, in the thing, and after the thing.

In singulars outside the intellect, there is nothing common.

Note concerning the number of most general [genera], most special species, and individuals.

The most special species of many categories are infinite.

Now we can understand that these have numerical properties that lead the species to individual existence.

logical. ¶ If, however, one does not wish to understand a natural genus as that which is apt for generality: and one does not understand the natural genus of that which is under it, attributing its name and definition to it: then "animal" is not a natural genus, as it were, except because it is merely animal. ¶ Attend, therefore, if it is correct that this intellectual [being] is subject and possesses generality or opposition: the judgment of all these is in the intellect, just as the natural judgment. ¶ It is more convenient, however, that "animality" in itself be sometimes called a general form, and sometimes an intelligible form: but from this, that it is animality, it is not a genus in any way, neither in the intellect nor outside the intellect, because it does not become a genus unless some respect is joined to it, either in the intellect or outside it. And we already find these two respects. ¶ Now, in the intellect, the nature of the genus is in two ways: sometimes it is in the intellect first, and then exists in sensible things, and exists in extrinsic multiplicity: just as someone understands some artificial thing first, and afterwards brings it into act; sometimes through this being in sensible things, and then formed in the intellect: just as when it happens to someone to see some men, and from them the human form is imprinted in him. ¶ And, in short, sometimes an understood form is the cause of the existence of the forms that are in sensible things, and sometimes the forms that have existence in sensible things are in some way the cause of the existence of intellectual forms—namely, those that exist in the intellect after they already had existence in sensible things. But because everything that exists is in relation to God and to the angels, just as the relationship of artificial things that are among us is to the human artisan, therefore that which is in the wisdom of the Creator and the angels, and comprised from natural things by the truth of cognition, has existence before the multiplicity. Whatever is understood of them is some intention. And afterwards, existence is acquired for them, which is in multiplicity, and when they are in multiplicity, they are not one in any way. In sensible things, externally, there is nothing common except only separation and disposition. Then again, intelligibles are held by us after they have been in multiplicity. ¶ Now, as for the fact that they are before multiplicity, and that they are intelligibles of one essence: whether this is multiplied because of them, or not—whose similarities they are—this treatise does not suffice for this, because it pertains to another treatise of wisdom. ¶ You must know, however, that this which we say about the genus is an example of the species, the difference, the property, and the accident, which will lead you to the way of understanding how these are intellectual, logical, and natural, and what of them is in multiplicity, and before, and after multiplicity. ¶ You must also know from yourself that those things which are in nature, as genera of genera, are more than one and are finite, as we shall declare afterwards. Those things, however, which are species of species, which are preserved in nature, are finite; they themselves, however, in themselves are infinite in potentiality. For the species of the species of many categories that follow are not finished, such as the species of the species of quantity, of quality, of position, and of others. ¶ Individuals, however, are infinite according to generation and priority and posteriority and sensation, and the collocation of them in limited time is a finite division. ¶ An individual, however, does not become an individual unless the properties of the species are joined to the nature—extrinsic, communicating or not communicating—and some matter of this or that is designated to it. ¶ It is impossible, however, to join to the species as many intellectual properties as there might be, because in the end, it will not be possible to demonstrate the individuating intention by which the individual is constituted in the intellect. For if you were to say that Plato is tall, a handsome writer, such and such: as many properties as you might apply, the individuality of Plato will not be described through them in the intellect. For it is possible that the intention which is composed of all these might be held by many and by one; it does not demonstrate him to you except through existence, and the connection of the individual intention: just as if it were said that he is the son of that man, and is at such an hour a tall philosopher; it would happen at that hour that no one else would agree with him in those properties, and it would happen that you would know this individual; then you would know his individuality, just as you would know that which is sensible if it were pointed out to you with a finger—

or as if Plato were shown to you at the third hour; then his individuality would be certified to you, and this would be showing you his individuality. ¶ But the nature of the genus itself (unless something else is added to it above) is impossible to happen into that multiplicity. For this, which we say, that Plato or Socrates is an individual, is not an equivocal name, as many think, unless an individual is understood as some designated thing: for an absolute individual does not signify anything except one common intention. For when Socrates is said to be an individual, we do not wish to say that it is Socrates, but that this is a genus; that which is understood of him cannot agree to another, and in this intention, others agree besides him. ¶ Therefore, individuality is among the dispositions that happen to natures that are subject to generality and speciality, just as generality and speciality happen to it. ¶ The difference, however, that is between the human as a species, and the individual of man, which is common—not in name, but also in predication—to many, is this: we say that the intellect concerning man, who is a species, is that he is a rational animal; but what we say concerning the individual man is that this nature, accepted with the accident that happens to it, is joined to some designated matter, and this is so when we say "a certain man," namely, some rational animal; and "rational animal" is common to this: sometimes it is a species, sometimes an individual, namely this one named. For the species is "rational animal," and thus "rational animal" as an individual is a particular substance; thus the commonality which is "rational animal" is in man, and it is "certain" according to contingent respects; thus this which is "animal" is common to "animal" when the genus is accepted, and to "animal" when the species is accepted, and to "animal" when the individual is accepted. Generality, therefore, and speciality and individuality are not of particular substances such that one is under the other, but they are respects which happen to it, and appropriate it. And thus "man" is sometimes accepted with some accident, as "laughable man," and is predicated of particular substances of which any man is; thus also "singular man." For unity is among those things which accompany a thing, about which we will show afterwards that they are not what constitute the essence of a thing. ¶ Therefore, when unity is joined to humanity, there becomes a singular man or an individual, in which all individuals agree; nor yet is it therefore a species, because the conjunction is from nature and an accident, or one not accompanying or accompanying, but not constituting; and those things which are "man" do not constitute the species; thus "man" with "laughable" and "tearful" and "moving" and "resting" and thirdly with "receptive to beauty," and of one there is no other species; because "man" by itself is a species, since there follow accidents which are accidents of the species, not falling under the species by which there should be another new species, and this will be certified afterwards in first philosophy.

What is the difference between man who is a species, and the individual of man, which is common to many.

Commonality in things is twofold.

Why this common thing (the individual of man) is not a species of singular men, although all those things agree in it.

¶ The Logic of Prince Avicenna the philosopher, by the grace of God, ends.

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