The Poems of Tibullus and the Elegies of Sulpicia

IX

I myself strove with great study to partially recall this whole method to certain causes and certain principles, and partially to declare what should be attributed to it in terms of design, times, and the people for whom that work was destined. I argued that different genres of commentary could be useful and commendable; provided only that, in the first place, those for whom we write may rightly understand the writer's words, thoughts, and subject matter; and in youthful reading, that judgment may be sharpened both in eliciting the true sense and in perceiving the truth of the thought, and that a sense of the good and the beautiful may be moved and excited. Good criticism has and maintains its praise; yet it does not contain or effect everything we seek, just as good interpretation cannot exist without the truth of the reading. Let there be editions that are occupied solely with criticism, others that are occupied solely with interpretation; let there be those that embrace both. Let the interpretation itself be instituted in a few words or many, as it may please or be deemed advisable. Let some be occupied with converting the writer into the native language, others in another genre of interpretation; for the versions, as we call them, are themselves a kind of continuous interpretation. Let each genre be constituted from its own nature and from design and usage. Yet, let its own praise be left also to this genre of interpretation, in which the proposal is not only to follow critical subtleties and niceties, but also to seek the thought; unless you firmly grasp this, you cannot even be certain about the truth of the reading, much less about the truth of the thoughts, the grace of the diction, and the rest. Moreover, in the reading of poets, you will often not reach the true sense, and you will hardly ever grasp the elegance and beauty of the poem, unless you have it ready to recall the poetic to the ordinary modes of expression; only then will it be possible to obtain clear notions and certain judgment. Thus, it is often easier to exercise criticism than to interpret well, even the things which you have thought out with critical acumen. Furthermore, let there be its own praise for that genre of commentary in which the causes of thoughts are derived from the very rationale of the language (whether established correctly or by usage?), and are appended (for it is permitted to hold in the mind the sense of what you read of any kind, so that you may not yet grasp the individual words or the force of the words and thoughts), drawn from the usage of writers and the opinions and judgments of the ages; brief and useful admonitions are also added about the thoughts and things themselves, or about the true and the beautiful. I see nothing in this that can be reproached, except that which you would reproach in other genres with equal right: if you have executed what you professed not with certain judgment, not with selection and design, not in a suitable language and manner, not ingenuously and modestly, but either with arrogance and superciliousness, or with the caviling and insults of others. But these are the vices of men, not of things, which ought to have been most alien to the studies of humanity. Let us, however, consult good letters and morals at least in this, that we bear that human infirmity with a calm mind, remembering the Ciceronian saying: original: "Conveniet — esse aequum et facilem, multa multis de iure suo cedentem." "It will be proper to be fair and easygoing, yielding many things to many people from one's own right." Written in the month of May, 1797.