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indeed be able, since death is the consequence of diseases. But how could premature death be absent from one to whom a mature death was established? Surely, they do not wish for any human to die unless they have completed their hundredth year of age. How could their reasoning hold up in such a contradiction of circumstances? For if it were impossible for anyone to die before a hundred years, some strength—which would be immortal—must be granted to them. Once that is granted, the condition of death must necessarily be excluded. But of what kind could this thing be, which would make a human solid and impregnable against diseases and external blows? Since a human is composed of bones, nerves, entrails, and blood, which of these can be so firm as to repel fragility and death? Therefore, so that a human might be indissoluble before that time which they think ought to have been established, from what material would they assign a body to him? Everything that can be seen and touched is fragile. It remains that they must seek something from heaven, since there is nothing on earth that is not infirm.
Since, therefore, a human was to be formed by God in such a way that he would eventually be mortal, the situation itself demanded that he be fashioned with an earthly and fragile body. It is necessary, therefore, that he receive death at some time, since he is corporeal; for any body whatsoever is dissoluble and mortal. Most foolish, therefore, are those who complain about premature death; for the condition of nature makes room for it. Thus, it will follow that he is also subject to diseases; for nature equally allows that infirmity can be absent from that body which must eventually be dissolved. But let us imagine that it could be possible, just as they wish, that a human not
Mature. Thus the manuscripts of Tornesius, Erasmus, and Cauci, along with the editions of Gryphius, Cratander, Betuleius, Thomas, and Spark. This reading is best referred to that "premature death" which immediately precedes it. In 21 manuscripts and 5 printed editions, it is "nature," incorrectly. This word is missing in three Oxford manuscripts.
Which of these. We have placed this here from all manuscripts and common editions, except for the Claromontanus and three editions in which it is "what."
Eventually. After "eventually," two Bononiensis manuscripts, Taxilianus, Bodleian, two Regius (recent), two Colbertinus, the Claromontanus in the margin, and the editions of 1472, 1478, and 1497, as well as the Tridentinus, Florentinus, and Isaeus add, "and moved always by itself," which is absent in the others. Furthermore, these words, which are a gloss, are also omitted by O. F. Fritzsche in his recent edition of the works of Lactantius.
Receive death. That is, be capable of death, so that he may be able to die. Bun.
Most foolish, therefore. Thus, with the older editions and Cellarius, all manuscripts except two recent ones and others in which "are" is added.
Which must eventually be dissolved. We have restored this from 5 Regius manuscripts, 5 Colbertinus, Marmoutier, Lipsius, Gothanus, Emmeranus, Cantabrigiensis, Claromontanus, and older editions as well as Cellarius in Walch. ...and the 1 Regius, Victorius, Navarrensis, and 1 Colbertinus add "believing and favoring," in which it is "which must eventually be resolved"; and they reject therefore "it is not born solid and firm so that," which two Colbertinus manuscripts, one Sorbonensis, and the Claromontanus in the margin insert between these two words, "which eventually."
To be unable in any way to die at any other time. We have amended this from the Regio-Puteanus manuscript, and two other Regius, two Colbertinus, Gothanus, and Brunonianus manuscripts, favored by 5 others... ...in which it is "at all." Pen. and Claromontanus say "other," but in the latter, it is "human," as in the two Colbertinus and Baluzius. In 7 manuscripts it is "certain," incorrectly. In 2 Bononiensis, Taxilianus, and Lipsius, and in earlier editions, it is "that a human is in no way able to die at a certain time"; in Cauci and 7 printed editions, "a human, unless at a certain time." See the following.
If he can be prohibited from other sustenance. Besides the Tornesius manuscript and 7 recent editions in which it is "the nourisher," all manuscripts and editions have "other." Thus also the Betuleius codex. This is the best and genuine reading. For "other" does not refer to the victu sustenance, as some have thought. It means: if another [person] is an impediment to his use of sustenance, or has withdrawn the food. And Lactantius speaks this way below. Erasmus, Gallaeus, and Io. Cauci have sought a knot in a bulrush here. This error arose from a false construction. Everything is clear if you construct it correctly thus: "But if a human can be prohibited from sustenance by another (another human); or, as it immediately follows: If the supply of food can be withdrawn from him by another (i.e., someone else), he will be able to die." Bun.
Will become. This is in all manuscripts and editors, except Thomas, Thysius, Gallaeus, and Spark, in which it is "may become."
Who complain about the frailty of man. I have amended this from all manuscripts and editions except Gallaeus, who reads "humans."
No one. Six recent manuscripts and as many editions add "for," which is missing in the others. This is an objection born from the complaints of adversaries, to which Lactantius subsequently responds.
Surely... is not. These are missing in the Bov. manuscript.
To be. This verb, which is in all editions except Cellarius and in two Regius manuscripts, is lacking in the others.
Small seeds. Francius suspects that it should be read as "sediments," that is, atoms, regarding which see Book III of the Divine Institutes, ch. 17, and the book On the Anger of God, ch. 10.
Impacts. Thus all books consistently, and nothing is to be changed here. "The impacts of small seeds" are the impulses of atoms. Cicero, On Fate, ch. 10, is expressed here: "Epicurus says that the necessity of fate is avoided by the declination of the atom." Therefore, the third motion arises beyond weight and impact, when the atom declines by the smallest interval. Lucretius, Book II, v. 531: "From every side, due to the constant impact of missiles," and Book IV, v. 188, 190: "Which are as if driven... by the following excited impact." Bun.