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A [it is] sharp, just as in the eyes there is the act of seeing; the subtlety of which is inexplicable and wonderful, since He covered with membranes the orbs the eyes that display a likeness to gems, by which it was necessary to see, so that the images of things placed opposite, reflecting in a mirror, might enter into the sense. Through these membranes, therefore, the mind perceives; you might think that those things which are outside pass through, or that the image enters by incursion as the philosophers have said—since that which is seen ought not to be in that which sees—or by the intention of the air, with a glance or an effluence; since, if it were so, we would see the ray which we cast out, until the intent air and the poured-out rays reached that which was to be seen.
B If we see at the same moment of time, while doing something else, yet we nonetheless behold things that are placed opposite, it is truer and more manifest that it is the mind which, through the eyes, looks upon those things which are opposite, as if through windows covered with shining glass or with a transparent stone. And for this reason, the mind and the will are often recognized from the eyes. To refute this, Lucretius used a most inept argument. For he said, if the mind sees through the eyes, it would see better if the eyes were torn out and dug up; since doors torn away with their posts admit more light than if they were closed. Truly, for him, or rather for Epicurus who taught him, the eyes were dug up, so that he would not see. He did not see that with the orbs dug out, the fibers of the eyes ruptured, the blood flowing through the veins, the flesh growing from the wounds, and the scars finally closing over, they could admit no light; unless perhaps he wanted eyes to be born like ears, so that we might perceive not so much with eyes as with holes. Nothing could be made more foul for appearance or more useless for use. For how little could we see if the mind were to attend from the innermost recesses of the head through tiny slits of caverns; as...
2: If the workshop of the eyes cannot exist without eyes. Bun.—Whose subtlety is especially great and wonderful, etc. Galen, in book 10, ch. 6, provides a long and excellent discussion on how subtly this is handled by others; Bara. Isæus.
covered with transparent [membranes]. Cic. II On the Nature of the Gods.
the images of things placed opposite, as if shining, penetrated to the internal sense, he touches upon that difficult question regarding the manner of seeing, in which philosophers of various sects have labored, some asserting that vision occurs through an incursion, others again through the effluence of material and immaterial [things], and others through the movement of spiritual and immaterial things. See Plato in the Timaeus, where Arist. II, On the Soul, text 66 and following, and On Sense, ch. 2; Lucr. IV; Plutarch, book IV, ch. 13; Gell. book V, ch. 16; Saturn. ch. 14; Galen. book X, ch. 12; Hippoc. and Plato, book VII, ch. 9 and Averroes Collig. book III, ch. 38. What Lactantius thinks is not sufficiently clear. From the words above, he seems to assert that the images of things are received into the internal sense, that is, that not only did Aristotle teach this, but also the most serious men have approved of this opinion, Leonicus in his commentaries on the book On Sense and Sensible Things, Scaliger in his On Subtlety, ch. 325, ch. 5, and others. Isæus.
the thing which is called the mind, etc. According to that common saying, mentioned by Aristotle in his Problems 11, Problem 33: "The mind sees, the mind hears." If he had said soul or spirit, as others do, for Lactantius understands "mind" and "soul" in a far different way, as I said above, in book VII of the Institutes, ch. 12. Isæus.
are, he looks through. Lips. 2, he perceives. Nevertheless, he imitates Lucretius, book 4, v. 272-279; they are suspected. Bun.
by the incursion of things we perceive. Thus we read in the editions and mss., except 1 Colbert, which has concursion.
philosophers have said. Mss. 2 Colb., Em., Brun, Tul., Cellar., "have said." Others as in the text.
intention of the air, with a glance, etc. This opinion recalls [the view]: but [he thinks] the air near the pupil [is struck] by the rays...
...is struck against the things seen, and thus, by the assistance of the air itself, and as it were by a future motion, he thinks vision occurs; for that beaten air which touches the pupil is driven to the object, in which a base of the cone is made, the apex of which is in the pupil itself. This fabrication is shown by the reasoning of Lactantius to be not only vain, but also [incorrect], because we see no worse when we step backward, but by retreating that impulse cannot happen, but only by standing or proceeding. Moreover, the air will not penetrate under waters, at the bottom of which things placed are seen. Isæus.
C Or by the effusion of rays. All the opticians and most philosophers up to Aristotle held this opinion, whom Averroes then followed, and Julius Caesar Scaliger, who is to be compared with any of the ancients, criticizes Galen in his Exercitations on Subtlety, 298, ch. 16. Isæus.
"The ray which we advert to with our eyes, we would see." Thus 3 Reg., 2 Colbert, and the old Roman and Tridin. editions. The others printed in type and the mss. (except 1 ancient Bonon. which has "eyes") have, "we would see later than we advert with our eyes." But our reading has a much clearer sense.
"It is the mind which, through the eyes, etc." Salvian, On Providence, book III, ch. 7: "Knowing that the light of the eyes are, in a way, windows of our minds." Others have called the eyes the doors of the soul; Origen Adamantius, Physiognomy, book I, ch. 1; Cicero calls them "indices of the soul" in De Oratore. Gataker.
D "As if through windows." Thus Cic. 1 Tusculans: "So that it can be easily understood that the mind both hears and sees, not those parts which are as it were windows, etc." Isæus.
"With shining glass." Mss. 2 Bonon. and 4 others, "transparent." Heumann also likes to write this, but the others have "shining."
"With transparent stone." This transparent stone, cut into very thin sheets, was inserted into windows. Pitiscus writes about this at full length in his Lexicon of Roman Antiquities, Vol. 2, fol. 826. Bun.
"Lucretius." These are his verses:
Furthermore, if our eyes are like doors,
The mind, with the doorposts themselves removed,
Ought to see things better with the eyes taken away.
"He wanted [them] to be born." Thus I have corrected it from all mss. and the Roman edition and other older ones. In 14 common editions it is "they wanted."
"For use." Thus I restored it from mss. 2 Bonon., 5 Reg., 6 Colb., 3 Oxon. and 9 others, the Roman edition of 1470, and Cellar.