HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY OF LAW.

They are found erected in the Capitol, and written in the archaism (if the gods please) of those times: let faith rest with the author. Certain fragments of the laws of Numa remain, collected with the faith and diligence of Fulvius Ursinus, to whom, or to Festus and Pliny, I refer you regarding various readings and various corrections. Indeed, he is cited by some as an author of Roman laws. Virgil is of this opinion (Aeneid, Book 6):

Who is that man far off, distinguished by olive branches,
Bringing sacred offerings? I recognize the hair and hoary chin
Of the Roman king, who first with laws
Established the city.

Hence Suidas thinks Numa was called so from the laws original: "ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων". Truly, the origin of laws is ascribed to both: Romulus for human affairs, Numa for divine. Numa taught sacred rites, ceremonies, and the entire worship of the Gods, and from these he gained great fame. Dio Chrysostom, in Oration 25, says he established laws, Gods, and the Republic, and was the entire author of the happiness that followed thereafter. To him (omitting Tullus Hostilius, Ancus Marcius, and Tarquinius Priscus, who proposed or sanctioned almost no laws) succeeded Servius Tullius, distinguished by his study and counsel, who not only restored the primary foundations of the city, or the old pomerium sacred boundary of the city, but also expanded the institutions of the state, that is, the Republic, happily begun by the kings before him. Finally, under his successor L. Tarquinius Superbus, royal power yielded to consular power, and this was the first age of the Roman People and, as it were, its infancy, which it spent under seven kings for 264 years.

§. 5. With the kings driven from the city in the year of the city 264, consular power held the Republic, having gained liberty with Junius Brutus as its defender and leader, and as Livy says, Book 2: "the powers of laws began to be more potent than those of men." The Republic retained the custom of convoking the people through curiae and centuries, instituted by the kings and immediately usurped by Junius Brutus. Dionysius, Book 4, at the end: "If you wish this opinion to be valid, give your vote divided by curiae" original: "ταύτην εἰ βουλομένοις ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τὴν γνώμην εἶναι κυρίαν διασάντες κατὰ φράτρας ψῆφον ἐπενέγκατε.". If you want this opinion to be ratified, cast your votes by curiae. He also convoked the people by Centuries, which Tullius had instituted; hence the centuriate assemblies, which Arnobius (Book 2, Against the Gentiles) calls "military," because the people, inflamed by military custom and Roman glory, treated matters of the gravest weight in that order. Cicero, in his oration after his return, to praise the consent of the people by which he was recalled from exile, says he was recalled in the centuriate assemblies: "on the day we were [recalled] in the centuriate assemblies, etc." The laws that were passed in these assemblies were called centuriate: and by Livy (Book 3) and Cicero everywhere, they are called consular, because only the consuls convoked these. By these same assemblies, the Valerian laws were passed by P. Valerius Publicola regarding the right of appeal (a notable sign of liberty). Valerius Maximus, Book 4, c. 1. By these same were passed the laws of the XII Tables. Livy, Book 3.

§. 6. This was peculiar to these assemblies: that before anything was committed to the votes of the people, it was first agitated in the Senate, and the fathers became the authors meaning they provided the initial sanction. Dionysius, Book 9, established this difference between the curiate and centuriate assemblies. In the earliest times, after the centuriate assemblies were held, the fathers became the authors, that is, they confirmed what the people had ordered by their votes. In this matter, the power of the Senate notably stood out; but this right was taken from the Senate and provided for by a law passed by the dictator P. Philo in the year 414, so that the fathers should become the authors of the laws that were to be proposed in the centuriate assemblies, as Livy writes, Book 8, and that before the assemblies were held, the fathers should apply their authority to the future decree of the assemblies. When the plebs were in tumult, tributary meaning assemblies by tribes [assemblies] were added to the Curiate and Centuriate assemblies during the consulship of A. Sempronius and M. Minucius in the year 262. Then finally, the curiate [assemblies] gradually vanished and remained only for the sake of auspices, so that magistrates who had been created in other assemblies were not created but confirmed in the curiate [assemblies], as attested by Cicero (Oration 2 in Rullus) and Livy (Book 9) concerning L. Papirius, whom the consul had declared dictator, and [to whom he granted] the curiate law regarding his command, etc. Laws that were passed in the tributary assemblies were called Tributary, which the Tribunes of the plebs proposed and the plebs enacted; sometimes, however, they were also called Tribunician, because they had been passed for the sake of establishing tribunician power. Thus Livy uses it in Book 5. In the former sense, they are "tribunician" because they had been passed by the plebs in tributary assemblies; in the latter, because they had been issued by the whole people in the centuriate [assemblies] regarding the power of the Tribunes. The former were called Tributary from the magistrate who proposed them, and from the magistrate who was confirmed; the former are called plebiscites, the latter are properly called laws.

§. 7. In this matter, the religious scrupulousness of Justinian is to be observed, who separated plebiscites from laws (§. 1. I. de jur. natur.), although Capito had mixed both together according to Gellius (Book 19, c. 20) and had comprehended them in this definition: "A law is a general command of the people and the plebs." Capito was moved by the fact that he responded to those consulting him from the mind of both laws and plebiscites, since plebiscites held all men no less than laws, and all citizens were subject to them. In this matter, there is great similarity between law and plebiscite; hence it happened that the Aquilian law, which was proposed by the plebeian tribune Gallus Aquilius, was so called from the opinion of Capito, his colleague. On the contrary, Justinian distinguished between them for various reasons; for the author of a law is one person, the author of a plebiscite another. In one place a law was established, in another a plebiscite; the author of a law was the people, the author of a plebiscite the plebs. A law [was passed] in centuriate assemblies, a plebiscite in tributary [assemblies], in which the Tribunes of the plebs dealt only with the plebs, according to Gellius (Book 15, c. 26): "The Tribunes of the plebs neither summon the patricians nor can they refer any matter to them." They could not convoke the patricians, nor refer any matter in any assembly, unless a higher magistrate permitted it. Therefore, Livy (Book 6) is the authority that a tribune of the plebs accused T. Manlius before the people convoked in centuriate [assemblies], where Sigonius rightly says, "by permission of the consul," as he gathers the same from Livy (Book 26). For when the Tribunes of the plebs were about to propose something before the people, a day for the centuriate assemblies had to be sought from a higher magistrate, and in the absence of a consul, from the urban praetor. Livy (Books 23 and 43) says that the tribune of the plebs Sempronius and Rutilius, after they had announced a trial for treason to the accused, sought a day for the assemblies from the urban praetor; in this sense, I think Gellius (Book 13, c. 14) says: "it is one thing to deal with the people, another to speak to the people." The Tribunes spoke to the people, [but] only the higher magistrates dealt with the people. The Tribunes, therefore, says Gellius (Book 13, c. 24), "neither summon the patricians nor can they refer any matter to them." Thus, they are not properly called laws but plebiscites. While the Republic stood, whatever was decreed by the people was called by the name of law because it had the force of law, just as is said of any pleasure of the prince. Livy (Book 5) calls the decree by which Camillus was recalled from exile a "curiate law," and arrogatio adoption of a person sui iuris, which was done by the people in the assemblies, is said to be done by law according to Gellius (Book 5, c. 19). Adoption for this reason is said by Cicero in Pro Domo Sua to have been made by P. Clodius, through which he was made a plebeian. Livy (Book 1) says the judgment of Horatius, who was accused of treason, was made by curiate law; and war was decreed by the people by law, and was said to be done by law, because the power of the people was equal in special and general matters, and that being considered, whatever the people decreed was law.

§. 8. But the Jurisconsults (who look at the common precept by which it is prescribed that right be rendered to each) use the name of law more strictly.