The Consolation of Philosophy

he provides a remedy through the loss of money. Looking at a conscience stained with disgraceoriginal: "conscientiam spectans" and comparing his fortune with his own state, perhaps he fears that there might be a sad loss of a thing whose use is pleasant. He will therefore change his ways, and while he fears to lose his fortune, he abandons his wickedness. For others, an unworthily increased happiness has precipitated them into deserved ruin. To some, the power of punishing was permitted, so that it might be a cause of exercise for the good and a cause of punishment for the bad. For just as there is no alliance between the upright and the wicked, so the wicked cannot even agree among themselves. Why? Since they dissent from themselves, their consciences torn apart by vices, and they often do things which, when they have done them, they decide ought not to have been done. From this, that supreme Providence has often brought forth a notable miracle, so that the wicked might make the good better. For while some perceive themselves to suffer unjust things from the worst men, they, burning with hatred for the harmful, have returned to the harvest of virtue, while they strive to be unlike those they hated. For the divine power is the only thing to which even evils are good, since by using them competently, it elicits the effect of some good. For a certain order embraces all things, so that even what has departed from the assigned reason of order, it may fall back—even if into another place—into order, so that nothing in the kingdom of Providence may be left to chance. “But it is difficult for me, like a god, to declare all these things”original: "’Αργαλέον δ’ ἐμὲ ταῦτα θεὸν ὣς πάντ’ ἀγορεύειν": for it is not right for a man either to comprehend or to explain all the mechanisms of the divine work.

² However, it is difficult for me to utter all these things as if I were God.

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...both: looking at his conscience.—13 ‘Another reading in the manuscripts, which I highly approve: comparing himself with his own fortune.’ Bernart. The Delphin and Hack editions also have this.—14 Mss. and Nuremberg, Florence, Delphin, and Hack editions: lest of whom to him.—15 Vulgate: conducted happiness. Vict.: increased by secondary happiness.—16 Thuanus, first: as exercise.—17 Thuanus, both; Regius; and both Victorius editions: every one.—18 ‘Decide must be done] Correct in manuscripts and Florence edition: decide.’ Sitzm.—19 That it has departed from the assigned reason of order Vulgate, Erfurt Mss., and Nuremberg edition: that which has departed from the designated reason of order. Regius: of the signed. ‘Perhaps, of the assigned: correct.’ Vallin. Thuanus, both; Victorius, second; and Florence: has departed.—20 The Delphin and Hack editions omit the little word same.—1 Regius and Victorius, first: divine work.—2 This

NOTES

° For a certain order, etc.] For just as there is one beginning and one end for all created things, so it is necessary that there be one order of these same things, one Providence, which, as it is infinite, we can neither comprehend with the mind nor explain with words: for Homer says it best in the Iliad, M: “But it is difficult for me,” etc., that is: but it is difficult for me to utter all these things as if I were God.