The Consolation of Philosophy

[they] are slightly turned aside from our intended path: d and it is to be feared, lest you, fatigued by e devious paths, be unable to reach the straight road. "Do not," I said, "entirely fear that. For it will be a place of rest for me to recognize those things in which I most delight; at the same time, when every aspect f of your discourse has been established with undoubted faith, nothing will remain in doubt concerning what follows. g Then she said, "I will comply h with your request," and she began thus. i 2 "If," k she said, "someone defines chance as an event produced by d rash motion and with no connection of causes, I affirm that chance is nothing at all, and I decree it to be an entirely empty word, beyond the meaning of the subject matter itself: l for when God keeps all things in order, what place can remain for any rashness? For it is a true maxim that nothing comes from nothing, a point which no one among the Ancients ever disputed: m although they did not cast this as a foundation of all reason regarding the acting principle, but regarding the material subject, that is, nature. n But if something were to arise from no causes, it would appear to have arisen from nothing. 3 If this cannot happen, then a chance of this kind is not possible, of the sort we defined a little while ago." "What then?" I said. "Is there nothing that can rightfully be called chance or a fortuitous event? Or is there something, even if it escapes the common crowd, to which these terms correspond?" "My Philosophus Philosopher Aristotle," she said, "defined that in his Physics Book II, ch. 5 with a brief and near-truthful account." "In what way?" I asked. "Whenever," he says, "something is done for the sake of one thing, and something else occurs for certain causes other than what was intended, it is called chance: as if someone digging the earth for the sake of cultivating a field were to find a buried weight of gold. This is believed to have happened by chance Quæstus gain or utility, indeed: but it is not from nothing; for it has its own proper causes, the unforeseen and unexpected concurrence of which seems to have produced the chance event. For if the tiller of the field had not been digging the earth, if the depositor had not buried his money in that place, the gold would not have been found. These, therefore, are the causes of this fortuitous gain, which arises from causes meeting and flowing together, not from the intention of the agent. For neither he who buried the gold, nor he who worked the field, intended that the money should be found; but, as I said, it happened that the latter dug where the former had buried it."

d Somewhat alien to our inquiry.
e From extraneous questions.
f Every consideration of your question.
g Let it be doubted.
h I will obey.
i She began.
k If.
l Which signifies no subject thing.
m Contradicted.
n Not regarding the efficient cause, but only regarding the matter or the thing being modified: as if they had said that the mode or reason is not of nothing.

See the example of Virgil's Aeneid I, v. 6: "He came to Italy, a fugitive by fate, and to the Lavinian shores."

c Every aspect of your discourse] Such as the antecedents, concomitants, and consequents: we commonly call these 'facets' of a question: "The things we consider," says the Author of the Book on the Search for Truth, "never appear entirely evident to us, except when the understanding has examined all their sides and all their relationships."

d If, she says, someone [defines] an event, etc.] Philosophy next explains the various uses of this name, 'chance,' and teaches how 'chance' ought to be rejected and admitted. Clearly, 'chance' is said to derive from 'falling' in that sense where 'to fall' is the same as 'to happen': for which reason 'chance,' generally speaking, is nothing other than an event. But that event can be spoken of in two ways: first, as one produced by no connection of causes; second, as one produced by some connection of causes. If 'chance' is defined as 'an event produced by rash motion and with no connection of causes,' then certainly 'chance' is nothing more than an 'empty word,' since...