Prologue

Note that the present...?

Here begins the writing upon the First Book of Sentences, edited by Brother John Duns Duns Scotus, the Subtle Doctor, of the Order of Friars Minor, a most subtle doctor and prince of all theologians.

Desiring referring to the incipit of the text: "Cupientes aliquid scire..." something concerning the penury of things. Regarding the prologue of this first book of the Sentences, five things are sought. The first concerns the necessity of this doctrine and relates to the genus of the efficient cause. It is the question: whether it is necessary for man in this present state to have some special doctrine supernaturally inspired. The second relates to the genus of the formal cause. It is the question: whether supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer a traveler or one on the path to salvation has been sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture. The third relates to the genus of the material cause. It is the question: whether theology is about God as its primary subject. The fourth and fifth pertain to the genus of the final cause. The fourth is the question: whether theology is a practical science. The fifth is the question: whether, because of its order toward practice as an end, it is called a practical science in its own right.

This question, whether for man in this state some supernatural doctrine is necessary?

First, it is asked whether it is necessary for man in this present state to have some special doctrine supernaturally inspired, to which the intellect cannot attain by natural light. And it seems not. Every power having some common thing as its primary natural object can have an act concerning anything contained under that as its proper natural object. This is evident from the example of the primary object of sight and other things contained under it, and similarly by induction in other primary objects and powers. It is also evident through reason, for the primary object is said to be that which is adequate to the power; but if there were something within its scope about which the power could not have an act naturally, it would not be adequate to the power, but would exceed the power. Therefore, the major premise is evident. But the primary natural object of our intellect is being ens existence/that which is insofar as it is being. Therefore, in

Concerning the debt...?

our intellect can naturally have an act concerning any being, and thus concerning any intelligible thing, even concerning non-being, because a negation is known through an affirmation. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: Avicenna, first Metaphysics, chapter 5. Being and the thing are imprinted on the mind with the first impression, nor can they be made manifest from others. If, however, there were anything other than these as the primary object, these could be made manifest through the reason of that thing, but this is impossible. Therefore. Furthermore, sense does not need any supernatural knowledge for this state, therefore neither does the intellect. The antecedent is evident. Proof: Nature does not fail in necessities, 3 De Anima Aristotle's "On the Soul". And if it does not fail in imperfect things, much more does it not fail in perfect things. Therefore, if it does not fail in inferior powers concerning the things necessary for them to have their acts and to pursue their end, much more does it not fail in the necessities of the superior power for its act and for attaining its end. Therefore, etc. Furthermore, if some such doctrine is necessary, this is because the power in pure natural terms is disproportionate to the object as it is thus knowable. Therefore, it is necessary that something other than itself be made proportionate to it. That other thing is either natural or supernatural. If it is natural, then the whole is disproportionate to the primary object. If it is supernatural, then the power is disproportionate to that, and so it follows that through another it must be made proportionate to it, and so on to infinity. Since, therefore, it is not possible to proceed to infinity, 2 Metaphysics, it is necessary to stop at the first, saying that the intellectual power is of itself proportionate to every knowable thing and according to every mode of the knowable. Wherefore, etc.

To the contrary

I say that such... to be done naturally... toward the end...?

2 Timothy 3: "All scripture inspired by God is useful for teaching, for arguing," etc. Furthermore, Baruch 3, it is said concerning wisdom: "There is no one who can know her ways, but He who knows all things knows her." Therefore, no one else can have her unless from the One who knows all things. This concerns the necessity. In fact, he adds: "He handed her down to Jacob his servant, and to Israel his beloved." This concerns the Old Testament, and it follows: