Questions on the Four Books of Sentences

After this, "He was seen on the earth and lived with men," that is, when He handed it down regarding the New Testament.

In this question.

There is a controversy that otherwise the end could be more aptly reached and the theologian, beyond the first end regarding all causes, might stand apart from this, [not] knowing theology other than through reason?.

There appears to be a controversy between philosophers and theologians. For the philosopher holds to the perfection of nature and denies supernatural perfection. Theologians, however, recognize the defect of nature, the necessity of grace, and supernatural perfection. The philosopher would therefore say that there is no supernatural knowledge necessary for man in this present state, but that he could acquire every piece of knowledge necessary for himself from the action of natural causes. To this, he brings forward both authority and reason. He says there referring to Aristotle that the agent intellect intellectus agens the active component of the mind is that by which it is possible to make all things, and the possible intellect intellectus possibilis the passive component of the mind is that by which it is possible to become all things. From this he argues thus: when the natural active and passive principles are duly brought together and not impeded, an action necessarily follows which does not depend essentially on anything except them as the prior causes. But the active principle regarding all intelligible things is the agent intellect, and the passive is the possible intellect, and these are naturally in the soul. And they are not impeded, as is evident through the natural virtue of these powers, so that the act of understanding regarding any intelligible thing can follow.

In this the philosopher proposes? that? something? is?...

The reason is confirmed. To every natural passive power corresponds some natural active power; otherwise, the passive power would seem to be in vain in nature if it could be reduced to act by nothing in nature. But the possible intellect is a passive and natural power regarding all intelligible things; therefore, some natural active power corresponds to it. Therefore, the proposition follows. The minor is evident, because the possible intellect naturally desires knowledge of any knowable thing; it is also naturally perfected by any knowledge, and it is naturally receptive to any understanding.

By these arguments I prove that theologians... are natural and cannot be made without the help of the King and God?...

Furthermore, 6 Metaphysics, he divides speculative science into metaphysics, physics (or natural science), and mathematics. And from the proof of this therein, it does not seem possible for there to be more speculative habits, because in these one considers concerning

the whole of being except according to its relation to all its parts; just as there could not be any other speculative science than these, so neither could there be any other practical one. Because the practical sciences acquired are sufficient to perfect the practical intellect, and the speculative ones acquired are sufficient to perfect the speculative intellect. Furthermore, one who can naturally understand the principle can naturally know and understand the conclusions included in the principle. I prove this because the knowledge of conclusions depends only on the intellect of the principle and on the deduction of the conclusions from the principle, as is evident from the definition of "knowing" in the first Posterior Analytics. But the deduction is self-evident, as is evident from the definition of the perfect syllogism in the first Prior Analytics, which needs nothing else to appear evidently necessary if the principles are understood and the deduction is manifest. It is self-evident that they have all that is necessary for the knowledge of the conclusion. Therefore, the major premise. Just as we naturally understand the first principles in which all knowable conclusions are virtually included, therefore we can naturally know all these knowable conclusions. Proof of the first part of the minor: because the terms of the first principles are most common. Therefore, we can naturally understand these, because, from the first Physics, the most common things are understood by us first. But we know the principles insofar as we know the terms, first Posterior. Therefore, we can naturally know the first principles. Proof of the second part of the minor: because the terms of the first principles are most common. Therefore, when they are distributed, they are distributed for all inferior concepts. But such terms are taken universally in the first principles, and thus they extend themselves to all particular concepts, and consequently to the extremes of all speculative conclusions. Wherefore, etc.

Against this position

one can argue in three ways. First thus: for every agent acting through knowledge, a distinct knowledge of its end is necessary. I prove this because every agent acting for an end acts from an appetite for the end, and every agent in its own right acts for an end, because every agent in its own right seeks its end in its own way. And just as

distinct knowledge is desired? is a twofold knowledge, one for the knowledge of the end from which it is evident before, and distinct [knowledge] that? it seeks the primary end, and through this it is evident? through the philosopher? that? [the] end is not distinguished [from] this thing other?