Questions on the Four Books of Sentences

Argument from sense?

A natural agent necessarily has an appetite for the end on account of which it ought to act. Likewise, for an agent acting by cognition, which also acts in itself according to the second book of the Physics Aristotle's treatise on natural philosophy, there is a necessary appetite for its end on account of which it ought to act, which follows upon cognition. Thus, the major premise is evident. But man cannot clearly know his end from natural things. Therefore, that of the gods there is a need for supernatural cognition. The minor premise is proven first because a philosopher following natural reason either posits that happiness is perfected in the cognition of acquired separate substances, as appears in the first book of the Ethics Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, or, if he does not definitively assert this to be the highest possible for us, he does not conclude it by any other natural reason, such that relying solely on natural reason, he will either err regarding the end in particular or remain in doubt. Whence, in the first book of the Ethics, chapter 18, he says while doubting: "If therefore there is any other gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness is given by God, and most of all among human things, that which is best." Secondly, the same minor premise is proven through reason: because the proper end of no substance is known by us except from its acts, which are manifest to us, from which it is shown that such an end is suitable for such a nature. However, we experience no acts, nor do we know them to be in our nature in this present state, from which we might know the vision of separate substances to be suitable for us. Therefore, we cannot naturally know clearly that this end is suitable to our nature. ends on account of which At least this is certain: that certain conditions of the end, on account of which it is more desirable and to be sought more fervently, cannot be definitively concluded by natural reason. For even if it were granted natural reason would suffice that natural reason were sufficient to prove that the the enjoyment of God is the end of man. Yet naked vision and enjoyment of God is the end of man, it would still not conclude that it perpetually suits man perfect in body and soul, as will be said in the fourth book of the Sentences, distinction 43. 4. d. 43. And yet the perpetuity of this good is a condition rendering the end more desirable than if it were transitory. Also, for man to attain good in a perfect nature is more desirable than in a separated soul, as Aug. 12. appears through Augustine, book 12, on Genesis. It is necessary to know these These and similar and similar conditions of the end to effectively seek the end, and yet natural reason does not suffice for them. Therefore,

2nd proof A a doctrine handed down supernaturally is required. Thus: for every knower acting on account of an end, a triple cognition is necessary. First, how and in what way the end is acquired. Second, cognition of all things that are necessary for the end. Third, it is necessary to know that all these are sufficient for such an end. The first is clear because if one does not know how the end is acquired, he will not know how to dispose himself for the attainment of that end. The second is proven because if he does not know all the things necessary for the end itself, through ignorance of some necessity, he could fail in the end. And also as regards the third, if he does not know that these necessities are sufficient, by doubting that he is ignorant of something necessary, he will not effectively pursue that which is necessary. But the wayfarer the soul in its earthly pilgrimage cannot know these three by natural reason. Proof of the first: because beatitude is conferred as a reward for merits that God accepts ...reason God accepts as worthy of such a reward. And it is evident that it does not follow by any natural necessity from our acts, whatever they may be. Rather, God contingently grants some acts in order toward it as meritorious. However, this is not naturally knowable, as it seems, because in this the philosophers erred, positing that all things which are from God are immediately from Him of necessity. At least the other two members are manifest. For the acceptance of the divine will cannot be known naturally, as if, for example, it were simply accepting such or such things as worthy of eternal life. And because that it also suffices depends merely on the divine will regarding those things toward which He relates Himself contingently. Therefore, etc.

Against these two

reality, i.e., of the author, i.e., for the redemptor...

arguments, one insists. And first against the first, thus: Every created nature essentially depends on every cause per se. And on account of such dependence, through the known cause, one can demonstrate that every cause of it per se can be known. Therefore, since the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, because it is not disproportionate to the cognitive power, it follows that from this known nature, the end of that nature can be naturally known. The reason is confirmed: if from a known inferior nature its end is known, it is no less possible in the present case, because there is no lesser dependence nature prefer...

Nature, 12th book of the Metaphysics, it is best, and in us for the time being.