Questions on the Four Books of Sentences

The marginalia in this section discuss the nature of ratione reason/concept and the distinction between formal and material definitions of substances. It notes that what is "proper" to a nature is not immediately accessible to human intellect.

state of fallen nature. Regarding the second [argument], I concede that we do not have a mode of cognition concerning the soul or any of its powers that is so distinct that one could know from it alone that some such object corresponds to it. Rather, from the act itself which we experience, we conclude the power and the nature whose act it is to regard that object, which we perceive is reached through the act. Thus, the object of the power is not concluded from the cognition of the power, but from the cognition of the act which we experience. But concerning a supernatural object, nor to this [end] can they we can have neither cognition. Therefore, in that case, both ways of knowing the end through the proper nature of that [object] fail.

To the Argument

against the second reason, it is clear because it presupposes something already denied. To the confirmation of that reason, I say that when an end follows naturally from those things which are directed toward the end and naturally perfects them: then from the end, those things which are toward the end can be concluded. Here, however, there is no natural consequence, but only an acceptance of the divine will, which compensates for these merits as worthy of such an end.

Thirdly, it is argued

principally against the opinion of the philosophers in the 6th book of the Metaphysics Aristotle's Metaphysics. The cognition of separated substances i.e., angels or immaterial beings is the most noble, because it is about the most noble genus. Therefore, the cognition of those things which are proper to them is most noble and necessary. For those things proper to them are more noble and perfect objects of knowledge than those in which they coincide with sensible things. But those proper things we cannot know from purely natural means. I prove this: because if these proper things were to be taught in any science naturally possible, they would all be in Metaphysics. But it is not naturally impossible for us to have [knowledge] concerning the proper passions i.e., attributes of these separated substances, as is clear in two ways. First, thus: because those things are not included virtually in the first subject of metaphysics, that is, in Being. This is also what the Philosopher Aristotle says in the first Metaphysics, that it is necessary for the wise person to know all things in some way, that is, in a universal and not a particular way. And he adds: He who... here it is added against what was promised to deny, that is, what is glossed

The marginal notes here reflect on the incapacity of human reason to grasp divine essence, noting that human intellect cannot move from its own concepts to comprehend the Trinity or separated substances.

...knows universals, knows all subjects in some way. But he calls the metaphysician wise, just as he proves there to be wisdom in metaphysics. Concerning the divine Secondly, I prove it by reason: because such things are not known by a cognition of the "propter quid" reasoning from cause to effect unless their proper subjects are known, which subjects include such "propter quid." But the 1 that they are not proper subjects of them are not naturally knowable by us. Therefore, etc. Nor are those properties of them known by a demonstration which as is shown in is proved, for instance, from effects. For the effects either leave the intellect in doubt regarding these [substances] or lead it into error, which appears from the properties of the first immaterial substance in itself. For the property of its nature is that it is which [is] strictly belonging communicable to three referring to the Trinity. But the effects do not show this property because they are not from it and therefore unknown insofar as it is three. And if one argues from the effects to the cause, they lead more to the opposite and into error, because in no effect No is one nature found except in one suppositum individual entity/subsistent being. Also, the property of this nature toward the exterior is to cause contingently, and the effects lead more to the opposite of this into error, as is clear through the opinions of the philosophers who posit ...and understanding... who truly [?] about them it is said that in these... which were communicable... were the properties of all... and in it the reason of the origin... and reason... divine... in which... and all proper substance... and reason... it is shown... and our genus of... which properly the property... of God... not if... transferred... is the first [cause] to cause necessarily. Regarding the properties of other substances, the same is clear, because the effects lead more to sempiternity, eternity, and necessity of them than to contingency and novelty. Similarly, the philosophers seem to conclude from motions that the number of these separated substances is according to the number of celestial motions. Similarly, that those substances are naturally blessed and impeccable, just as the philosophers posited, all of which are most absurd.

Against this reason

Henry in the Summa

I argue and prove that whatever necessary truths about separated substances are known by us now through faith or through common revelation can be known by natural cognition. And this is so: We naturally know the terms of whatever necessary revealed things, and we can naturally...

A manicule points to this insertion.
Note that it is not concerning the proper attributes to place into its own nature the reason for those [things] which in the supposition are outside of it, in the proposition.