Questions on the Four Books of Sentences

1st middle in... in... in...

...comprehend. But we naturally know the terms of all necessary revealed things. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise: Those necessary truths are either mediated or immediate. If immediate, then they are known when the terms are known, priori from what is prior or posteriori from what is posterior. If mediated, then since we can know the extremes, we can conceive the middle between them; and then, by joining that middle with each extreme, either the premises are had mediated or immediately. If immediate, the same as before. If mediated, we will proceed by conceiving a middle between the extremes and joining it with the extremes until we come to immediate truths. Therefore, eventually, we will come to necessary immediate truths which we will understand from the terms from which all necessary mediated truths follow. Therefore, those mediated truths can be known through immediate ones naturally. Proof of the minor premise: Because one who has faith and one who does not have faith, contradicting each other, do not contend only about names but about concepts. Just as when the philosopher and the theologian contradict each other about "God is three," where not only the same name but the same concept one denies and the other affirms. Therefore, every simple concept which the one has and the other has...

Reason toward this

Logical diagram showing a, b, and c.
Immediate / Mediated

To that, I respond: regarding separated substances, there are some truths which are immediate. I take then some such first and immediate truth, and let it be 'a'. In this, many mediated truths are included, for instance, all those which particularly enunciate common things to the [others], b and c. These true mediated things do not have evidence except from that immediate one. Therefore, they are not born to be known except from that immediate one understood. If, therefore, any intellect could understand the terms 'b' and 'c' and compose them with one another, but could not understand the terms of 'a', nor consequently 'a' itself, it will be a neutral proposition to his intellect.

it is added

It is so with us, because we have some common concepts about immaterial and material substances, and these we can compose with one another. But these complexes do not have evidence except from true immediate truths which are about those quiddities what-nesses under a proper and special definition, under which definition we do not conceive these quiddities; and therefore, we do not know those general truths about general concepts.

1st... in species

Example: If it is impossible for someone to conceive a triangle under its proper species, he can nevertheless abstract the definition of "figure" from a quadrangle and conceive it. It is also impossible for him to conceive "primarity" as it is a proper passion of a triangle, because he does not conceive it in this way unless it is abstracted from the triangle. Nevertheless, he can abstract primarity from other primarities, for instance, in numbers. This intellect, although it could form this complex, "some figure is primary," because it can apprehend its terms, that composition formed will be neutral to him because this is a mediated truth included in this immediate one, "a triangle is thus primary," and this immediate one he cannot understand because he cannot [understand] its terms. Therefore, the mediated one cannot be known, which has evidence only from this immediate one.

triangle, part, etc. primary

By this, to the argument: I deny the major. To the proof, I say that those necessary truths are mediated. And when you say, "Therefore, since we can know the extremes, we can conceive the middle between the extremes," I deny the consequence. Because the middle between extremes is sometimes essentially ordered, for instance, the quiddity of the other extreme or a prior passion with respect to a posterior passion. And such is the middle for concluding a universal extreme about an extreme. I concede, therefore, that whoever can understand the extremes can understand such a middle between such extremes, because his intellect is included in the other extreme if it is a passion, or it is the same as the other if it is the "what-it-is" of the other extreme. If, however, the middle is a particular contained under the other extreme and not essentially ordered between the extremes, then it is not necessary that one who can conceive the extremes...

To the 3rd argument... order... Middle... Commented...
From this it is clear why in the intellect there are those opposite of the written [text] are held.

A complex logical schematic at the bottom right. Lines connect 'Mediū' (middle) to 'quid est' (what-it-is) and 'pā prior' (prior passion). The structure maps how one reaches the quiddity of a part.