Questions on the Four Books of Sentences

Application

1st reason... to him

...general [concepts] to be able to conceive a particular middle to those general extremes. It is so here; for this quiddity, under its proper and particular definition, having some passion inherently attached to it immediately, is a middle inferior to the concept common to it, of which that passion is said in the common sense. And therefore, it is not a middle universally inferring a passion from the common, but only particularly. This is clear in that example, because it is not necessary that one who can perceive "figure" in common can conceive "triangle" in particular: because triangle is a middle contained under figure. A middle, I say, to conclude primarity particularly about the figure.

The marginal note is obscured, but appears to relate to the failure of reason to attain specific knowledge.

¶ This 3rd reason concludes most potently about the first immaterial substance, because its cognition, as the beatific object i.e., God, is most potently necessary. And then this response to the objection against it: It presupposes that now we naturally do not conceive God except in a general concept common to him and sensible things, which I explain in book 3, q. 1. Even if one denies that presupposition, it is still necessary to say that a concept which can be made of God by virtue of a creature is imperfect, whereas one that would be made by virtue of his essence would be perfect. Therefore, just as it was said about the general and special concept, so let it be said through another way about the imperfect and perfect concept.

Refers to Thomas Aquinas's Summa, I, q. 12.

Fourthly, it is argued

principally as follows. That which is ordered to an end for which it is of itself indisposed, it is necessary to be promoted little by little to the disposition with respect to that end. But man is ordered to a supernatural end for which he is of itself indisposed. Therefore, he needs to be disposed little by little to having that end. This, however, is done through some supernatural cognition. Therefore, etc. ¶ If one insists that a perfect agent can immediately remove the imperfection and act immediately. ¶ It is replied that if he can [do so] by absolute power, nevertheless, it is more perfect that some activity be communicated to man with respect to his final perfection being pursued, than not to communicate [it]. Man can, however, have some activity with respect to his final perfection of the final intention. Therefore, it is perfect that this be communicated to him, which cannot be done without some imperfect cognition preceding that perfect [cognition] to which he is finally ordered.

References to Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Thomas Aquinas regarding the intellect.

Fifthly, it is argued

thus: Every agent using an instrument in acting cannot, through that instrument, perform an action which exceeds the nature of that instrument. The light of the agent intellect Aristotelian concept of the mind's active capacity is an instrument which the soul now uses in natural understanding. Therefore, it cannot, through that light, [perform] any action which exceeds that light. But that [light] is of itself limited to cognition had through the way of the senses. Therefore, the soul cannot [perform] any action which cannot be had through the way of the senses. But the cognition of many other things is necessary for this state. Therefore, etc. ¶ This reason seems to conclude against the one who made it, namely, Master N. likely referring to a contemporary like Henry of Ghent, this deduction: Uncreated light will not be able to use the agent intellect as an instrument for the cognition of any sincere truth, since such, according to him, cannot be had through the way of the senses without special illustration. And thus it follows that in the cognition of sincere truth, the light of the agent intellect has in no way any action, which seems inconvenient, because that action is more perfect than all understanding; and by consequence, that which is more perfect in the soul, insofar as it is intellective, must concur in some way to this action. ¶ These two reasons do not seem very effective. For the first would be effective if it were proved that man is ordered finally to supernatural cognition, the proof of which pertains to the questions about beatitude. And if, with this, it were shown that natural cognition does not sufficiently dispose for this state to obtain supernatural cognition (the 2nd reason begs two [things]: namely, that the cognition of some things is necessary which cannot be known through the way of the senses, and that the light of the agent intellect is limited to such knowable things).

References to the works of Henry of Ghent and Thomas Aquinas.