Questions on the Four Books of Sentences

Therefore, the first three reasons appear more probable.

determination ... matter ...?

To the question, therefore, I respond

by first distinguishing how something is said to be supernatural. For a receptive potentia power/potency is compared to the actus act/actualization it receives, or to the agent from which it receives it. In the first way, it is a natural, violent, or neutral power. It is natural if it inclines naturally; violent if it is against a natural inclination; and neutral if it inclines neither to this form nor to the opposite. In this comparison, nothing is supernatural. But comparing the receptive to the agent from which it receives the form, there is "naturalness" when the receptive is compared to such an agent that is born to naturally imprint such a form in such a patient i.e., the one receiving the action. However, it is "supernaturalness" when it is compared to such an agent that is not naturally the imprinter of that form into that patient.

... form ...?

To the point, I say that by comparing the intellectus possibilis possible intellect to actual knowledge within itself, there is no supernatural cognition for it, because the possible intellect is perfected by whatever cognition it naturally attains, and to which it is naturally inclined. But speaking in the second way, that is supernatural which is generated by some agent that is not naturally born to move the possible intellect to such cognition. However, for this state i.e., the present life, according to the Philosopher i.e., Aristotle, the possible intellect is born to be moved to cognition by the intellectus agens agent intellect and the fantasma sensory image/phantasm. Therefore, only that which can be imprinted by these agents is natural. Yet, by the power of these, all incomplex i.e., simple, non-propositional cognition that is held according to common law by the traveler i.e., a soul on earth can be had, as is clear in the instance against the third principal reason. And therefore, although God can cause the cognition of something incomplex through special revelation, as in an ecstasy, nevertheless such supernatural cognition is not necessary by common law. But it is otherwise regarding complex truths, because as has been shown by the first three reasons

of the distinction?

brought against the first opinion, with all the action of the agent intellect and the phantasms posited, many complexes i.e., propositional truths will remain unknown and neutral to us, the cognition of which is necessary for us. Therefore, it is necessary for the knowledge of these to be handed down to us supernaturally, because no one could naturally discover their knowledge and hand it down to others by teaching, because it will be neutral to everyone—just as to one, so to any other—out of natural things. But whether, after the first transmission of doctrine, someone can naturally assent to the doctrine handed down about such things, [I will speak] of this in Book 3, Distinction 23. This first transmission of such doctrine is called revelation, which is therefore supernatural because it is from an agent that is not naturally a mover of our intellect for this state.

but it seems where thus ...?

Otherwise, it could also be called supernatural because it is from an agent supplying the place of a supernatural object. For the object born to cause the knowledge of this—"God is three and one"—or of similar things, is the essence known under its proper aspect. For it, under such a cognizable aspect, is an object supernatural to us. Therefore, whatever agent causes the knowledge of some truths that are born to be evident through such an object known in this way, that agent in this supplies the place of that object. If the agent itself caused perfect knowledge of these truths, such as the object itself known in itself would cause, then it would perfectly supply the place of the object. But if the agent does not cause such perfect knowledge as the object in itself would cause, then it imperfectly supplies the place of the object, insofar as the imperfect knowledge it makes is virtually contained in that perfect one of which the object, known in itself, would be the cause. So it is in the proposal. For the one revealing this—"God is three"—causes in the mind some knowledge of this truth, though obscure, because it causes it about the object not under its proper known aspect; for if it were known, that object would be born to cause perfect and clear knowledge.