Questions on the Four Books of Sentences

of that truth. Therefore, insofar as this obscure knowledge is included in that clear one eminently, as the imperfect in the perfect, insofar does the revealer of this obscure thing, while causing it, supply the place of that object causative of clear knowledge, especially

this agent reveals

since the knowledge of any truth cannot be caused except as supplying the place of some object. Nor could the knowledge of such truths about that object cause [knowledge] as a substitute for the object of some inferior thing naturally moving

to act and to create in species

our intellect, because no such thing virtually includes any knowledge of these truths, not even the obscure kind. Therefore, it is necessary that in causing even this obscure [knowledge], it somehow supplies the place of a supernatural object.

¶ The difference between these two ways of positing revealed supernatural knowledge is clear by separating one from the other; for instance, if a supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, such as if it were to infuse geometry into someone, that would be supernatural in the first way and not the second. But if it were to infuse the knowledge of this—"God is three"—or similar things, this would be supernatural in both ways, because the second implies the first, though not conversely. Where there is only the first, there it is not necessary that it be "supernatural" in such a way that it cannot be had naturally. Where, however, the second mode exists, there is a necessity that it be had supernaturally, because it cannot be had naturally.

The three primary reasons

by which this solution is supported are confirmed by authorities. First, by the authority of Augustine in The City of God, book 18, chapter 41: "The philosophers," he says, "not knowing to what end these things were to be referred, were able to see truth among the false things they spoke." The second reason is confirmed by Augustine, 2nd [book] of The City of God, chapter 2: "What does it profit to know where one should go, if one is ignorant of the way by which one should go?" For in this the philosophers erred, that even if they handed down some true things about virtues, they mixed in false things according to the preceding authority of Augustine, and it is clear from their books. For Aristotle rejects the polities i.e., political structures arranged by many others by politicians. But not even that of Aristotle is irreprehensible. [In] the 7th of the Politics, where he teaches that the gods are to be honored, he says: "It is fitting to exhibit worship to the gods." And in the same place: "The law dictates that no bastard child be nurtured." And in the same book, chapter 8, he says that abortion ought to be performed in a case. The third reason is confirmed by Augustine, 11th of The City of God, chapter 2: "Things which are removed

3rd reason confirmed

from our senses, which we cannot know by our own testimony, we seek other witnesses for them." And this confirms the whole principal solution. Because the complexes, neither of which we are argued about, are neutral to us in themselves; no one can believe in them by his own testimony. But it is necessary to require the supernatural testimony of someone of a higher nature than the whole human species. However, how the first revelation or transmission of such doctrine could have been made, or was made, is a doubt—whether by interior speech, or exterior, or with some signs added sufficient to cause assent. To the point, it suffices that in either way such doctrine could be supernaturally revealed, but in no way could it be first handed down by man without error.

Against these three

reasons, it is insisted at the same time that they destroy themselves. Because

1st reason

what it shows to be necessary to know, it shows to be true, because nothing is known unless it is true. And whatever these reasons show to be necessary to be known—for example, that the fruition

2nd reason

of God in Himself is the end of man regarding the first reason; that the way of arriving at it is through merits which God accepts as worthy of such a reward regarding the second; that God is

3rd reason

three and contingently causing such things as this regarding the third—all of that it shows to be true. Therefore, either those reasons are only from faith, or from them the opposite of what they prove is concluded. I respond: by natural reason, it is shown to be necessary to know

Soto

one part definitely of this contradiction: "Fruition is the end," [or] "Fruition is not the end." This is that the intellect does not become lukewarm or neutral in this problem—whether fruition is the end—because such doubt or ignorance would impede the investigation of the end.

shows

The marginal inserts and unclear text appear to be notes regarding the necessity of knowledge and the logical status of "fruition" as an end, likely echoing the main text's argument that reason can establish the necessity of the question, if not the answer, without faith.